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ABSTRACT—Controversy over the Senate’s filibuster practice dominates
modern discussion of American legislative government. With increasing
frequency, commentators have urged that the upper chamber’s requirement
of sixty votes to close debate on pending matters violates a majority-rulebased norm of constitutional law. Proponents of this view, however, tend to
gloss over a more basic question: Does the Constitution’s Rules of
Proceedings Clause permit the houses of Congress to adopt internal
parliamentary requirements under which a bill is deemed “passed” only if it
receives supermajority support? This question is important. Indeed, the
House already has such a rule in place, and any challenge to the Senate
cloture rule is doomed from the start if that body may self-impose
supermajority voting thresholds even for the actual enactment of laws.
Existing scholarly work in this area, however, is incomplete. The most
elaborate treatments invoke originalist principles to claim that the chambers
of Congress may freely adopt supermajority (as well as submajority) billvoting requirements. These treatments have spawned critical responses, but
none of them focuses in full-blown fashion on the words and deeds of the
Framers themselves. This Article fills the resulting gap by offering a wideranging argument against supermajority voting rules based on constitutional
text, constitutional structure, and background understandings that pervaded
the framing period. Taken as a whole, these controlling indicators of
original meaning establish that a bill is passed if and only if it receives a
majority vote.
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INTRODUCTION
In July of 2011, a bipartisan group of Senators known as the “Gang of
Six” put forward a far-reaching plan to deal with the then-looming federal
debt-ceiling crisis.1 One feature of their proposal called for establishment of
annual spending caps, while another authorized departure from those caps
only if the Senate approved that action by a vote of at least sixty-seven
members.
The idea of imposing congressional supermajority voting rules, without
amending the Constitution, was not new. In 1994, pursuant to a so-called
“Contract with America,” Republican House candidates throughout the
nation pledged that they would, if elected, install a 60%-vote requirement to
pass any law that increased any income tax rate.2 In fact, a Republican
majority was swept into office, and it promptly made good on its promise
by adopting House Rule XXI(5)(c).3 The rule specified that “[n]o bill or
joint resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a Federal
income tax rate increase shall be considered as passed or agreed to unless so
determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths of the Members voting.”4
1

See Press Release, Senator Saxby Chambliss, A Bi-Partisan Plan to Reduce Our Nation’s Debt and
Deficit (July 27, 2011), available at http://chambliss.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=
ec2df064-c619-4330-97a6-4f67233dd184.
2
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 8 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (setting forth a
commitment to “require a three-fifths majority vote to pass a tax increase”).
3
See Susan Low Bloch, Congressional Self-Discipline: The Constitutionality of Supermajority
Rules, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 1–2 (1997).
4
The original House rule was set forth at H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong. § 106(a) (1995), reprinted in
H.R. DOC. NO. 103-342, at 658 (1995).
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The House has since tweaked the text of this rule, but its basic requirement
of a 60%-vote threshold remains on the books today.5
Rule XXI(5)(c) sparked a firestorm of constitutional debate.6 Its
defenders insisted that nothing in the Constitution blocked adoption of
supermajority voting requirements.7 Instead, they found support for these
requirements in Article I’s stipulation that “[e]ach House may determine the
Rules of its Proceedings.”8 Critics shot back that Rule XXI(5)(c) offended
the Framers’ presupposition that any bill would be deemed “passed” under
Article I, Section 7, so long as a majority voted in its favor.9 They also
emphasized that the new rule was “unprecedented” in imposing a
supermajority voting requirement for the enactment of ordinary federal
legislation.10
This debate was noteworthy in part because of the prominence of key
participants. Defending the rule, based on what I call the “Any-VotingNumber Theory,” were the nation’s most prolific analysts of legislative
supermajoritarianism, Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport.11
5

The current tax-related rule, which continues to embody a supermajority-vote requirement,
appears in clause (5)(b) of Rule XXI. H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, at 889–90 (2011). For simplicity’s sake,
this Article will refer only to the original provision, Rule XXI(5)(c). H.R. DOC. NO. 103-342, at 658.
6
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman et al., An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539
(1995) [hereinafter Open Letter]; Brett W. King, Deconstructing Gordon and Contingent Legislative
Authority: The Constitutionality of Supermajority Rules, 6 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 133 (1999) [hereinafter
King, Deconstructing Gordon]; Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Provisions in the Constitution:
The Framers, The Federalist Papers and the Reinforcement of a Fundamental Principle, 8 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 363 (1998) [hereinafter King, Use of Supermajority]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J.
483 (1995) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport I]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The
Rights of Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of
Legislative Supermajority Rules, 47 DUKE L.J. 327 (1997) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport II]; Jed
Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73 (1996).
7
See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 484.
8
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
9
See Open Letter, supra note 6, at 1540 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 397 (James Madison)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
10
Id. at 1539; accord King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 135 (observing, following the
adoption of Rule XXI(5)(c), that “[f]or the first time in history, more than a simple majority of members
is now required to vote in the affirmative before certain bills are considered as ‘passed’ by a house of
Congress”); see also Max Minzner, Entrenching Interests: State Supermajority Requirements to Raise
Taxes, 14 AKRON TAX J. 43, 43 (1999) (“At the opening of the 104th Congress, the new Republican
majority imposed the first supermajority requirement ‘limited to particular cases’ in the history of
Congress.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 58, supra note 9, at 397 (James Madison)). But cf. Open
Letter, supra note 6, at 1543 (noting that the only prior deviation involved “recent innovations” initiated
in 1985 dealing with the specialized “budget reconciliation process” in the Senate).
11
Their writings on this subject include: John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our
Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703 (2002); John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1999);
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative
Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003); see also supra note 6 (noting other works of Professors McGinnis
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Arrayed against these advocates was a small army of no less prominent
academics, including Professor Jed Rubenfeld, who authored the group’s
most elaborate critique of Rule XXI(5)(c).12
Also striking were the contending styles of argument put forward by
these analysts. Professors McGinnis and Rappaport focused on originalist
reasoning, emphasizing text-based inferences and background
understandings they saw as prevailing at the time of the framing.13 Professor
Rubenfeld also advanced textual and historical arguments,14 but his point of
emphasis lay elsewhere.15 Decisive to him were the intolerable practical
implications of the McGinnis-Rappaport approach. Among other things,
according to Professor Rubenfeld, no sensible view of the Constitution
could tolerate an outcome that would permit either chamber of Congress to
identify any percentage of votes (be it 1%, 40%, 60%, or 100%) as
determinative with regard to the passage of any or all bills.16 That, however,
was just the outcome that the Any-Voting-Number Theory endorsed.
Obscured by the nature of the Rubenfeld critique was an important
point—namely, that the originalist argument of Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport itself is open to a powerful originalist attack. In taking on Rule
XXI(5)(c), Professor Rubenfeld chose to focus his considerable talents in
large measure on other matters,17 and latter-day fellow travelers have tended
to follow his lead.18 As a result, I go in this Article where no one has gone
and Rappaport). In more recent works that examine Senate filibuster rules, Professors Fisk,
Chemerinsky, and Roberts have signaled substantial agreement with Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 242
(1997); John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the Constitutionality of the
Senate Cloture Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505, 530 (2004).
12
See Rubenfeld, supra note 6. Other signatories of the “Open Letter,” which set the stage for
Professor Rubenfeld’s piece, were Professors Ackerman, Amar, Balkin, Bloch, Bobbitt, Fallon, Kahn,
Kurland, Laycock, Levinson, Michelman, Perry, Post, Strauss, Sunstein, and Wellington. See Open
Letter, supra note 6, at 1544.
13
See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 330–31 (focusing on “the legal and linguistic
context of the framing,” while faulting Rubenfeld because he “appears to eschew inferences from
history, structure, and purpose”).
14
See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 76.
15
See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 346–47 (describing Rubenfeld’s analysis as
“originalist or textualist” in only a “limited sense”).
16
See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 80–83.
17
See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 329 (noting that Rubenfeld’s argument focuses on
“a variety of hypotheticals” and the “absurd consequences” of a legislative supermajority rule).
18
See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 3, at 4 (emphasizing the “distorting impact adding supermajority
requirements can have on the other branches”); Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster,
43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1006, 1012–14 (2011) (attacking the constitutionality of the supermajority
filibuster rule because it might lead to recognition of legislative power to entrench incumbent Senators);
Josh Chafetz & Michael Gerhardt, Debate, Is the Filibuster Constitutional?, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 245, 246 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Filibuster.pdf (Chafetz,
Opening Statement) (“Our Constitution . . . cannot countenance this sort of self-entrenchment by
incumbents.”); King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 175–76, 181 (reasoning that arguments
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before, by advancing a comprehensive originalist argument that the
Constitution embodies an unyielding principle of legislative
majoritarianism in enacting ordinary laws, which Rule XXI(5)(c) and other
rules of its kind offend.19
This conclusion finds support in the text, structure, and history of the
Constitution. As to text (which is the subject of Part I) and structure (which
is the subject of Part II), close study shows that a premise of unabridgeable
congressional majority voting runs through much of the original
Constitution and is compromised in no way by the Rules of Proceedings
Clause. A look at the history of the founding period (which is the subject of
Part III) confirms that the Framers embraced a strict norm of legislative
majoritarianism. Indeed, the Any-Voting-Number Theory stands at odds
with four separate elements of our constitutional history: (1) the pervasive
acceptance in Anglo-American parliamentary practice of majority rule at
the time of the framing, (2) then-ascendant philosophical views about the
essential role of majority-based decisionmaking within republican systems,
(3) the shared practical goal of ridding the new government of
supermajority voting rules because rules of that very kind had immobilized
the federal legislature under the Articles of Confederation, and (4) the
Framers’ forging of key political compromises built on a binding norm of

from “democracy, history, and tradition” render the McGinnis-Rappaport position “highly suspect” but
focusing on “the practical and potential consequences of [their] position”).
19
I pause to note four overarching points. First, modern commentators have sought to tease out
distinctions among various theories of originalism, with particular attention being paid in recent years to
the ratifying-community-centered concept of “original meaning.” See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (1997). The analysis presented here is fully
consonant with that approach, and the references it makes to historical sources (such as the Philadelphia
Convention debates, dictionaries, background theoretical writings, and THE FEDERALIST PAPERS) are
common fare in any form of originalist exegesis.
Second, few will be surprised to learn that justiciability doctrines may complicate judicial review of
self-imposed congressional rules. Compare Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding
challenges to Rule XXI(5)(c) nonjusticiable), with id. at 837–41 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (finding no
obstacle to judicial review). Jurisdictional complexities, however, in no way diminish the significance of
the analysis offered here. Members of Congress, no less than Justices, take oaths “to support this
Constitution” and thus not to support rules that offend its commands. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. The
foundational constitutional issues considered here are of enduring and recurring importance, and thus the
duty of our legislative representatives—as well as that of our courts—to honor the Constitution in
addressing them is of enduring and recurring importance, too.
Third, much of this Article challenges the writings of Professors McGinnis and Rappaport. But make
no mistake about the seriousness of their work: It sets forth a detailed line of argument, which is
couched in temperate tones. Indeed, the value of the McGinnis and Rappaport articles, as a starting point
for analysis, is (I hope) brought into focus by this piece.
Finally, while the work of Professor Rubenfeld and others does not focus to the extent this Article
does on originalist reasoning, it contains much material that reinforces the argument made here.
Concerns about absurd results, for example, have a role to play in any originalist inquiry. See infra note
196 and accompanying text. There can be no doubt, then, that this Article builds in important respects on
the earlier work of Professor Rubenfeld and the other critics of the McGinnis-Rappaport approach.
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congressional majoritarianism, including the Great Compromise on largestate and small-state power.
The analysis offered here is important in and of itself. It is all the more
important, however, because it bears on related issues, including the
constitutionality of the Senate’s long-disputed treatment of filibusters.
According to that body’s cloture rule, the agreement of sixty senators is
required to end debate on most pending matters.20 Critics of this rule have
challenged its constitutionality on the ground that it is functionally
indistinguishable from a supermajority voting rule.21 This argument, in turn,
has stirred forceful rebuttals, including in Senate hearings conducted in
2010,22 as well as in a recent scholarly exchange between Professors
Chafetz and Gerhardt.23
This Article is linked to the escalating controversy over the filibuster in
two ways. The first linkage arises because no argument against the sixtyvote cloture rule based on the norm of legislative majoritarianism can
succeed if no such norm exists. Establishing the existence of this principle
is therefore an indispensible precondition to launching a constitutional
attack on the Senate’s cloture practice. The second linkage is more subtle
but no less important. In the end, the success of any challenge to the Senate
filibuster system will hinge not only on the existence of a fixed norm of
legislative majoritarianism, but also on that norm’s robustness. This Article
seeks to show that the case for recognizing this mandate is so strong that
there remains little, if anything, left to be said for the Any-Voting-Number
Theory. A constitutional principle of this vigor clearly undoes Rule
XXI(5)(c). And, precisely because of its potency, this same principle casts
an ominous shadow over analogues of that rule, including the Senate’s
supermajority-based filibuster regime.
I. SUPERMAJORITY VOTING RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution specifies that “[e]very Bill
which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall . . . be presented to the President.”24 If a bill receives a majority vote
within a chamber, has it “passed” for purposes of this clause? The argument
for the Any-Voting-Number Theory begins with the thought that the
Constitution does not address this question in pointedly express terms, and
in particular does not specify that the House and Senate may not impose on
themselves nonmajority voting rules under the Rules of Proceedings
20

U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 112-1,
at 21 (2011) (Rule XXII(2)).
21
See Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 18, at 247–48.
22
Examining the Filibuster: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong.
(2010).
23
See Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 18.
24
U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2.
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Clause.25 This would-be argument is, however, unpersuasive because many
requirements that our Constitution imposes are not set forth in pointedly
express terms. The Fifth Amendment, for example, nowhere specifies that
regulatory interferences with property may qualify as takings under a
multifactor balancing test,26 and the First Amendment does not on its face
speak of special rules that target “public fora”27 or “prior restraints.”28 In
these and many other instances, however, the Supreme Court has
recognized constitutional “sub-rules” that constrain government action in
light of the history and purpose of the relevant clause.29 Not surprisingly,
proponents of the Any-Voting-Number Theory acknowledge the existence
of many rules of this kind. Citing background understandings that prevailed
in 1788, for example, they argue that Article I’s grant of “legislative power”
bars entrenchment of laws over time, even when Congress acts pursuant to
one of its enumerated powers.30 By symmetry of logic, if governing
interpretative principles indicate that “passed” when standing alone means
“voted for by a majority,” these interpretive principles must be honored so
as to trump any otherwise operative authority granted by the Rules of
Proceedings Clause.31
25

See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 484 (“The Open Letter fails to identify a
constitutional clause that prohibits the three-fifths rule.”).
26
See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978) (identifying
several factors for determining whether a regulation constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment).
27
See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (noting the “stringent standards [the Court has]
established for restrictions on speech in traditional public fora”).
28
See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976) (noting that the Court has interpreted
the First Amendment to afford “special protection” to orders that impose a “‘prior’ restraint” on speech).
29
See Dan T. Coenen, The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible “Semisubstantive”
Constitutional Rules, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2835, 2855–56 (2009).
30
Indeed, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport advocate recognition of similarly extrapolated rules
that are said to constrain the chambers’ power to determine how bills are passed under the Rules of
Proceedings Clause. They would not uphold House rules, for example, that give a veto to a nonmember,
McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 332–35, that preclude certain members from voting on
certain bills (except apparently where the veto is on a matter as to “which [the member] is immediately
and particularly interested”), id. at 332 n.27 (internal quotation mark omitted), that condition one
chamber’s enactment of a bill on enactment by the other chamber, id. at 338–40, or that “confer[] one
vote on some Members while providing more than one vote to other Members,” id. at 333 n.28. None of
these limits is, however, expressly stated in the Constitution.
31
See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892) (holding that, in promulgating rules, Congress
“may not . . . ignore constitutional restraints”). Indeed, not infrequently, the Court has imposed limits on
Congress based on the Constitution’s “essential postulate[s],” Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
U.S. 313, 322 (1934), rather than its explicit terms. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47,
54, 72 (1996) (endorsing a nontextual limit on congressional power to expose states to suit in federal
court); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (extending this principle to state court actions). In
such cases, the Court has looked beyond particular textual passages to “historical understanding and
practice” and “the structure of the Constitution.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898, 905 (1997).
Of particular importance with respect to the norm of majority voting, the Court has rooted some
constitutional restrictions of this kind in controlling background assumptions about republican selfgovernment. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 819 (1995) (applying an
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In fact, even when read in isolation, the “passed” language of Article I
points toward a mandate of majority voting for at least three reasons. First,
well-settled practice in the framing period—and thus the common
understanding of the time—equated the passing of laws with a majority
vote, unless a Constitution or Constitution-like text provided to the
contrary.32 Second, even the most ardent proponents of the Any-VotingNumber Theory acknowledge that the word “passed” carries with it a
default rule of legislative majoritarianism.33 But if the term “passed”
denotes “voted for by a majority” in the absence of a contrary rule, it seems
entirely reasonable to say it denotes “voted for by a majority” without more.
Third, at least two early dictionaries include definitions that associate the
word “pass” with receipt of a majority vote.34 Of particular significance, a
portion of the law-related definition of “pass” provided by Noah Webster in
1828 was “to receive the sanction of a legislative house or body by a
majority of votes.”35 To be sure, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport point
to other dictionary entries that do not mention a majority vote, including
Samuel Johnson’s definition of “pass” as meaning only “[t]o be enacted.”36
A definition that equates “passed” with “enacted,” however, is not at all
inconsistent with a principle of majority voting, particularly in light of other
“egalitarian theme” and a “critical foundation for the constitutional structure” to void state-created
candidate qualifications); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (rejecting congressional
power to exclude elected members who meet constitutionally stipulated qualifications based on a
“fundamental principle of our representative democracy . . . ‘that the people should choose whom they
please to govern them’” (quoting 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 257 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington 1836) [hereinafter
ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (statement of Alexander Hamilton))); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534,
545 (1934) (drawing on the holding of Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884) (stating that
democratic elections must allow “the free and uncorrupted choice of those who have the right to take
part in that choice” in recognizing an implied federal power to regulate presidential elections)); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 428–29 (1819) (recognizing nontextual immunity of federal
instrumentalities from state taxation in large part because the federal citizenry is not fairly represented in
any single state’s legislature); cf. Roberts, supra note 11, at 540–41 (noting that although the “antientrenchment principle does not appear as such in the Constitution,” it is rightly implied because it
comports with “common understanding” and “lies at the heart of our representative democracy”). The
bottom line is apparent: If there exists a “fundamental principle of our representative democracy” that
endorses legislative majority rule, Powell, 395 U.S. at 547, that principle—even if nontextual in
nature—must operate to delimit congressional authority, including under the Rules of Proceedings
Clause.
32
See infra Part III.A.1.
33
See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
34
See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 77 (“When a legislative bill is finally assented to by a majority
vote of the body . . . , it is said to be ‘passed’ by such body . . . .” (omissions in original) (quoting 2
STEWART RAPALJE & ROBERT L. LAWRENCE, A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW 935 § 4
(Jersey City, Frederick D. Dinn & Co. 1883)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); infra note 35 and
accompanying text.
35
2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 31 (New York, S.
Converse 1828); see also McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 343 n.72 (noting this text).
36
McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 342 (alteration in original).
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early dictionary definitions that tellingly associate the word “majority” with
the enactment of laws.37 At the least, then, the word “passed” may be read
as an originalist matter to carry with it the idea of approval by majority
vote. And the large body of evidence set forth below signals that that
definition is significantly more plausible than reading the word to mean
something like “approved by whatever number of members the chamber
designates for itself by rule either for all bills or any particular groups of
bills at any given time.”
This large body of evidence supports a wide-ranging argument for
rejecting the Any-Voting-Number Theory. That argument begins with the
constitutional text itself, in keeping with the settled proposition that the
document’s terms must always be read in light of the company they keep.38
The Constitution, for example, nowhere states that federal courts may
nullify acts of Congress. In Marbury v. Madison,39 however, the Court
extrapolated this authority from the collaborative operation of three
interlocking pieces of the Framers’ handiwork: (1) the grant of federal
jurisdiction over cases “arising under the constitution,” (2) the identification
of the Constitution as “the supreme law of the land,” and (3) the vesting in
the federal courts of “judicial power.”40 Here, in like fashion, the “passed”
language of Article I does not stand alone. Indeed, the fixed norm of
legislative majoritarianism that this language reifies is so deeply woven
through the fabric of the Constitution that it finds support in no fewer than
seven separate clauses.41 We turn now to the most informative of those
37

See, e.g., 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (London, His Majesty’s
Law Printers 1771) (defining “majority” as including the following: “The only method of determining
the acts of many is by a majority; the major part of members of parliament enact laws . . . .”); GILES
JACOB, THE NEW LAW DICTIONARY 354 (London, Henry Lintot 1743) (including in the definition of
“majority” that “it is the Majority of Members of Parliament, which enact our Laws”).
38
See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 347 (emphasizing that “whenever a provision is
ambiguous, we properly read it in light of the rest of the document” and that “[s]ometimes other specific
provisions shed light on a dispute over the meaning of a particular clause”).
39
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
40
Id. at 173, 178–80 (emphasis omitted).
41
The sentence in the text refers to no fewer than “seven separate clauses” because several
provisions, in addition to the three clauses identified in the following sentence and discussed in detail in
the remainder of this Part, work against the Any-Voting-Number Theory. Those clauses include the
Quorum Clause, see infra note 45, the House and Senate Composition Clauses, see infra note 184, and
the Appointment and Qualifications Clauses, see infra note 187 and accompanying text. The case for a
fixed constitutional rule of legislative action may also gain ground by reading the term “passed” in pari
materia with Article I, Section 1’s vesting in Congress of the “legislative power” in light of historical
understandings that that power was to be wielded by majority vote. See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra
note 6, at 345 (relying on “fundamental” understandings and “writings at the time of the Framing” to
root the anti-entrenchment principle in Article I’s grant of “legislative power”). Finally, as one
commentator has argued at length, the case against the Any-Voting-Number Theory may find additional
support in the words of Article I, Section 3, which specifies that “each Senator shall have one vote.” See
Michael J. Teter, Equality Among Equals: Is the Senate Cloture Rule Unconstitutional?, 94 MARQ. L.
REV. 547, 553–54 (2010). Because these other clauses offer less direct support for the norm of majority
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clauses: (1) the term that establishes a two-thirds vote as determinative for
purposes of overriding presidential vetoes,42 (2) the clause that grants the
Vice President a tiebreaking power when the Senate is “equally divided,”43
and (3) the five specialized provisions in the original Constitution that
impose supermajority voting requirements only in highly exceptional
contexts.44 These provisions, especially in their joint operation, cut sharply
against the Any-Voting-Number Theory.45
voting than the clauses identified in the next sentence, they are not given extensive attention in this
Article. Even so, it merits emphasis that they reinforce the textual case against the Any-Voting-Number
Theory.
42
U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2.
43
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
44
See infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
45
Supporters of the Any-Voting-Number Theory also seek support in the constitutional text, but
their arguments are not convincing. They point, in particular, to the clause that states that “a Majority of
each [chamber] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business,” U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 1, claiming that the
Framers’ express establishment of a fixed majority quorum rule establishes by negative implication the
lack of a fixed majority voting rule for acting on bills because that subject received no similarly targeted
treatment in the constitutional text. See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 487. This argument
misses the mark. As Professor Amar has explained, specification of a clarifying quorum rule made
perfect sense because preexisting “state constitutions and British practice had varied widely on the
quorum question.” AKHIL REED AMAR, DRAFT BOOK (forthcoming Sept. 2012) (manuscript at 438 n.34)
(on file with author). In contrast, there already existed in 1787 a well-settled practice of majoritycontrolled legislative voting, absent constitutional specification to the contrary. Thus, constitutional
clarification was necessary in the former context but needless in the latter. See King, Deconstructing
Gordon, supra note 6, at 180–81. In fact, the Quorum Clause strongly supports a fixed norm of
legislative majoritarianism. Why? Because its central purpose was to safeguard majority-based
legislative decisionmaking by preempting the “baneful practice” under which minorities would block
majority action by simply not showing up. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 9, at 397 (James
Madison). For this reason, the Quorum Clause, as Joseph Story explained, helps undergird the principle
of dominant significance here—namely, that “to give the rule to the minority, instead of the majority” is
“to subvert the fundamental principle of a republican government.” 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 833, at 296 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833)
(making this point in analyzing the Quorum Clause); see also Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate
Filibuster: The Politics of Obstruction, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 467, 487 (2011) (“Both Madison and the
Supreme Court [in Ballin] saw the Quorum Clause as instantiating majority rule.”).
Along the same lines, the Electoral College Clause (which was altered by the Twelfth Amendment,
but in no way that is significant here) spoke of the need in presidential voting to secure “a Majority of
the whole Number of Electors” and, failing that, a “Majority of all the States” as represented in the
House. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. These references to majority voting in no way tend to prove that
majority voting is not required in passing bills. Again, as Professor Amar has explained,
preconstitutional practice was far from well settled in this context, and those uncertainties were greatly
magnified, to say the least, for the Philadelphia delegates because nothing like the Electoral College had
previously been seen on the face of the earth. AMAR, supra (manuscript at 438 n.34). By way of
example, it is noteworthy that Article I requires the vote of an absolute majority of whole membership of
the House in selecting the President when the electoral-college system fails to pick a winner. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. This specification made sense precisely because it departed from the otherwisegoverning majority-of-a-quorum rules applicable to enacting legislation. In short, “majority rule did not
go without saying” when it came to the Electoral College’s picking of Presidents, although it did go
without saying in the enactment of ordinary legislation. AMAR, supra.
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A. The Presentment Clause
The textual case against the Any-Voting-Number Theory draws in part
on language that lies almost right beside the term “passed” in the
Presentment Clause of Article I, Section 7. According to that clause, as we
have seen, “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be
presented to the President.”46 The Presentment Clause, however, does not
stop there. It goes on to provide that, if the President thereafter disapproves
the bill, “he shall return it” to the chamber in which it originated.47 Then,
“[i]f . . . two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be
sent . . . to the other House, . . . and if approved by two thirds of that House,
it shall become a Law.”48
The Any-Voting-Number Theory runs headlong into the logically
sequenced legislative process that the full text of the Presentment Clause
lays down. Under that theory, after all, each chamber of Congress can
require a three-quarters or four-fifths or even a unanimous vote for the
initial passing of any law. At the same time, that theory would not permit
the chambers to require more than a two-thirds vote to override a veto
because Article I definitively specifies that, if “two thirds of [both houses]
shall agree to pass” an unsigned bill, “it shall become a Law.”49 Does the
Constitution really permit the House and the Senate to require a greater
percentage of votes to pass a bill in the first instance than the Framers
themselves established as the single, fixed percentage of votes needed to
override the President’s rejection of a thus-passed measure? The answer
must be no, because otherwise Congress could require a greater vote for the
ordinary act of passing legislation than for the extraordinary act of
repudiating a presidential veto.50

46

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. (emphasis added).
50
This conclusion is bolstered by the Presentment Clause’s indication that the President is to have a
meaningful role in the bill-enactment process. This is so because, as a practical matter, the Any-VotingNumber Theory would permit Congress to “render[] the President’s concurrence a virtual formality” by
effectively ensuring an override even if a veto occurred. Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 84; see also
Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1014 (agreeing that “it would be structurally strange to allow the Senate to
impose a higher threshold for passing ordinary legislation than for passing a proposed constitutional
amendment or voting to override a presidential veto”). Notably, the Convention debates support this
conclusion. Early on, some delegates voiced support for an absolute presidential veto. 1 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 98–103 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter
FARRAND] (noting the effort of James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton “to give the Executive an
absolute negative on the laws”). That approach was abandoned, however, after George Mason of
Virginia advocated the current system, under which vetoes could be overridden, but only “by a greater
majority than was required in the first instance.” Id. at 102 (emphasis added) (statement of George
Mason).
47
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Faced with this roadblock, some commentators who would
countenance departures from majority-based voting on bills have advanced
what might be called the Almost-Any-Voting-Number Theory. These
analysts acknowledge that the Presentment Clause cannot permit the House
and Senate to require more votes to present a bill to the President than to
override the President’s post-presentment veto.51 Thus, they say, the House
and the Senate may adopt supermajority voting rules for passing laws, but
only if those rules do not push beyond a two-thirds voting-rule ceiling.52
This limit, so the argument goes, removes any incongruity between the
authority granted by the Rules of Proceedings Clause and the numerical
mandates of Article I, Section 7.
The difficulty with this effort to reconcile the Any-Voting-Number
Theory with the text of Article I is that it carries the seeds of its own
demise. The argument, after all, embraces the idea that the constitutional
text does constrain, by implication, the supposed power of the House and
the Senate to impose on themselves supermajority voting requirements
under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. If there is to be such an implication,
however, there is strong reason to say that it should not be one that gives
rise to a peculiar and unprecedented principle under which any or all bills
may be passed by votes of 1% (or 51%) to 66.7% (or 66.7% minus one
vote).53 Rather, the better implication is the one supported by simplicity,
history, and long-accepted practice—namely, that a bill is “passed” if, but
only if, it receives a majority vote.54 In short, the full text of the Presentment

51

See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 240–42.
See id.; accord Robert S. Leach, House Rule XXI and an Argument Against a Constitutional
Requirement for Majority Rule in Congress, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1997).
53
This strange range of numerical possibilities itself suggests the unwisdom of embracing the
Almost-Any-Voting-Number Theory. Some adherents of that theory say, for example, that all voting
rules are fine, including submajority voting rules. See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 489–90,
490 n.38. (Thus the reference to 1%.) Others may lack the temerity to endorse submajority rules,
especially in light of the Supreme Court’s seeming repudiation of them. See infra notes 132–34, 188 and
accompanying text. (Thus the reference to 51%.) In addition, it is unclear what the top-end voting
number under the Almost-Any-Voting-Number Theory should be. Some might say that the number
cannot exceed the voting number required to overturn a veto. (Thus the reference to 66.7%.) Others will
find it unacceptable to permit the same voting rule for the ordinary passage of laws as for the
extraordinary overriding of vetoes. (Thus, the reference to 66.6% minus one.) It is hard to believe that
the founders of our nation meant for interpreters of the Constitution to engage in such elaborate
homework in applied mathematics.
54
Indeed, there is another math-related problem with the Almost-Any-Voting-Number Theory.
Although prohibiting rules that require more than a two-thirds vote for passing bills, nothing in the logic
of the theory would outlaw, for example, a Senate rule that requires confirmation of presidential
appointees by a 70%, 80%, or 90% vote. There is no indication, however, that the Framers had in mind
such structure-tilting numerical extremities—and in particular the strange possibility that the Senate
could self-impose a stricter supermajority rule for confirming appointees than for passing laws, thereby
radically altering the power of presidents to select their key subordinates. See Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d
831, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (highlighting this difficulty).
52
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Clause—when read as a whole in light of the most straightforward practical
reasoning—creates grave difficulties for the Any-Voting-Number Theory.55
B. The Vice President Voting Clause
The norm of mandatory legislative majoritarianism also finds support
in Article I, Section 3’s specification that “[t]he Vice President of the
United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote,
unless they be equally divided.”56 According to the Any-Voting-Number
Theory, this clause sets forth nothing more than a “default rule,” so that the
Vice President may cast a tiebreaking vote only when the Senate has not
established its own nonmajority voting requirement.57 This argument falters,
however, because the provision simply does not read as a default rule.
To begin with, the clause presupposes that legally consequential tie
votes will occur—a result that, under a default-rule reading, the Senate can
defeat simply by adopting a generally applicable supermajority or
submajority voting rule.58 The clause also declares that the Vice President
“shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided,” thus implying that he
“shall have” a vote if in fact the Senate “be equally divided.”59 Against this
55

See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 45 (manuscript at 438) (relying largely on the text’s treatment of veto
overrides in concluding that “Article I presupposed that each house would ‘pass’ legislative bills by
majority vote”).
56
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
57
McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 488; accord Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at
241.
58
Indeed, in THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, Hamilton declared that it was “necessary” to give the Vice
President a tiebreaking vote so as to ensure “a definitive resolution of the body.” THE FEDERALIST NO.
68, supra note 9, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton). Describing such a power grant as “necessary,” however,
is difficult to square with a legal regime in which the Vice President need not be given a vote at all. See
King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 182 n.226. Even more to the point are the observations of
Justice Joseph Story. He explained, in his great treatise, that the Vice President Voting Clause was
adopted because, “if no casting vote were allowed” when the body was evenly split, “then the indecision
and inconvenience might be very prejudicial to the public interests.” 2 STORY, supra note 45, § 736, at
211. Under these circumstances, he continued, “the vice president would seem to be the most fit arbiter
to decide, because he would be the representative, not of one state only, but of all.” Id. (emphasis
added). Focusing on these points, Justice Story attributed to the Framers the understanding that “[i]n all
questions before the senate he might safely be appealed to, as a fit arbiter upon an equal division.” Id.
§ 735, at 210 (emphasis added). Viewing the Vice President as “the most fit arbiter” in “all questions
before the senate” does not jibe with a legal regime under which the Senate may freely render him not
the arbiter in tie-vote cases either in part or in whole. Yet that is exactly the regime that the Any-VotingNumber Theory seeks to attribute to the Framers and to do so in the absence of any supportive framingera evidence.
59
See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 537 (statement of Roger Sherman) (assuming that the
Senate’s presiding officer would have no vote “unless when an equal division of votes might happen”);
LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ¶ 298, at 115 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1856) (recognizing that
the Vice President “shall give the casting vote, when the body over which he presides is equally
divided”); see also 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
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backdrop, the Any-Voting-Number Theory cannot possibly be given full
sway. Consider a Senate rule that specifies that a bill passes only if it
receives fifty-one votes from then-sitting Senators. Such a rule would be
unconstitutional on its face because, under it, even when the Senate stood
“equally divided” in a 50–50 deadlock, the Vice President would be
divested of his constitutionally mandated and determinative vote.60 And if
the Senate cannot install a 51-vote requirement in keeping with the internal
structure of the Vice President Voting Clause, there is no apparent reason
why it should be able to install a 52-vote requirement, or a 60-vote
requirement, or a 67-vote requirement.
Again, the key point is apparent. The text of the Vice President Voting
Clause comports most logically with the Framers’ endorsement of a
straightforward and fixed norm of legislative majoritarianism.61 Indeed, the
Clause fits together with this norm in a distinctly compelling and elegant
way by establishing that outcomes in the Senate are to be decided by
majority vote—with the outcome in exceptional cases to turn on the
majority’s will as determined by the majority-creating action of the body’s
presiding officer.62
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. D, at 224–25 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young
Birch & Abraham Small 1803) [hereinafter TUCKER] (describing the Vice President’s tiebreaking voting
power as “a very important trust”); cf. Henry Barrett Learned, Casting Votes of the Vice-Presidents,
1789–1915, 20 AM. HIST. REV. 571, 571 (1915) (noting that through 1915 “there appear to have been
179 instances of the use of the casting vote by the Vice-President in the Senate”). See generally Adrian
Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 400–01 &
n.119 (2004) (noting “the framers’ decision to grant the vice president a tiebreaking vote” and
describing it as a “significant power”).
60
A nitpicking critic might challenge this statement on the ground that the Vice President does
“have” a “vote” in this setting, even though the vote has no effect. There are, however, two key
difficulties with this stance. First, it is no easy thing to say (at least with a straight face) that the Vice
President has a “vote” when that supposed vote involves an utterly meaningless act. Second, this
characterization of Article I, Section 3 offends the whole sense of the Clause, which is that the Vice
President’s follow-up vote in the event of a tie will not only be meaningful, but meaningful in a
powerful and dramatic sense in light of its decisive, tiebreaking quality.
61
The textual context in which the founders granted the tiebreaking power further supports this
conclusion. To begin with, the tiebreaking power is one of only two powers given to the Vice President
in the entire original Constitution, with the other involving the power of the Vice President to preside
over the Senate. It thus seems a matter of no little ambitiousness to say that fully half of the
constitutionally vested powers of this nationally selected officer may be entirely stripped away by the
unilateral action of the very body over which he is to preside. In addition, given the Constitution’s
command that the Vice President “shall preside” over the Senate, that body plainly could not provide by
rule that some person other than the Vice President should be its presiding officer. In its nature, then,
Article I, Section 3 puts a designated-presiding-officer limitation on the Senate’s “Rules of Proceedings”
power, which it then marries in a single sentence with the intimately related authority to break tie votes.
The close functional and textual kinship between these two powers gives reason to conclude that the
latter, like the former, is not freely removable by way of Senate rule.
62
This conclusion is emphatically confirmed by the well-recognized historical purpose of the Vice
President Voting Clause. As the Framing generation recognized, that purpose was to give the Vice
President “the casting vote” in his capacity as President of the Senate. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note
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C. The Enumeration of Supermajority Voting Rules
A third textual problem for the Any-Voting-Number Theory stems
from the Constitution’s specification of five situations—and only five
situations—in which the House or Senate is to act by supermajority vote:
when either house expels a duly elected member,63 when the Senate
convicts Presidents or other high officers on impeachment charges,64 when
the Senate ratifies a treaty,65 when the chambers put forward constitutional
amendments for action by the states,66 and (as we already have seen) when
the chambers act to overturn presidential vetoes.67 Not surprisingly,
adherents of the Any-Voting-Number Theory ascribe to this enumeration
only the narrowest of negative implications. They say that the listing means
merely that interpreters may not derive from the “Constitution itself” any

31, at 489–90 (statement of James Monroe) (“[The Vice President] is to succeed the President, in case of
removal, disability, &c. [sic], and is to have the casting vote in the Senate”); accord Remarks of Robert
Whitehill to the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 512, 512 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY] (noting that the Vice President “has the casting vote in the Senate”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 68,
supra note 9, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the Vice President “should have only a casting
vote”); see also TUCKER, supra note 59 (recognizing that the Vice President “is entrusted with” the
“casting vote”); WILLIAM SMITH, A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL
STATES WITH EACH OTHER, AND WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES 13 (Philadelphia, John Thompson
1796) (noting general state practice under which the presiding officer of the legislative house “has only
the casting vote”); 2 STORY, supra note 45, § 736, at 211 (discussing the Vice President’s
constitutionally vested power in terms of “a casting vote”). As Noah Webster made clear in his 1828
dictionary, the “casting-vote” was then understood to mean “[t]he vote of a presiding officer, in an
assembly or council, which decides a question, when the votes of the assembly or house are equally
divided between the affirmative and negative.” 1 WEBSTER, supra note 35, at 33.
The Any-Voting-Number Theory simply cannot be squared with the Framers’ design to give the
Vice President the casting vote power. After all, the most immediate effect of supermajority voting rules
is to render tie votes irrelevant, including for the Vice President. Such rules thus necessarily strip that
officer of the “deciding” vote, 1 WEBSTER, supra, at 33 (definition of “casting”), or the “decisive” vote,
2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 956 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989) (definition of
“casting”), that—as a basic definitional matter—the Framers’ vesting of “the casting vote” was meant to
create. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: FOR THE USE OF THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 133 (Washington, Joseph Milligan & William Cooper 1812) (“In
Senate, if they be equally divided, the Vice-President announces his opinion, which decides.”).
63
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
64
Id. § 3, cl. 6.
65
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
66
Id. art. V.
67
Amendments to the Constitution set forth two more supermajority voting rules. One bars onetime government servants who had joined the Confederacy from assuming important positions in the
federal government absent supermajority clearance. See id. amend. XIV, § 3. Another permits Congress
by a two-thirds vote to uphold a disability-based suspension of the President initiated by the Vice
President and the cabinet. See id. amend. XXV, § 4. These provisions are of a piece with the
Impeachment and Expulsion Clauses because they involve critical personnel matters concerning high
government officials. At the least, they do not involve anything remotely like the enactment of ordinary
laws.
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further supermajority voting mandates.68 The gist of this reasoning is that
there is no inescapable logical necessity to conclude that the Framers’
itemization of five supermajority voting rules forecloses the option of selfimposing additional rules of that kind.69 Thus, the five exceptions constitute
only a “minimal list” to which each chamber may freely add.70
The difficulty with this argument is that the negative-implication-based
interpretive principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not a rule of
inescapable logical necessity; rather, it is a rule of “sensible inference.”71
And in keeping with that sensible-inference approach, the Court has not
hesitated to apply the expressio unius principle to deem textual itemizations
exclusive in dealing with interpretive issues closely parallel to the one
considered here.72 Indeed, this approach has controlled analysis in such
landmark rulings about constitutional structure as Marbury v. Madison,73
Powell v. McCormack,74 and INS v. Chadha.75
Chadha illustrates the point. There, Congress claimed a power to pass
laws that would permit either chamber to overturn agency actions, made
pursuant to a statutory delegation of authority, by way of a unicameral
override.76 The challenger argued that these “legislative vetoes” violated the
Presentment Clause because they involved congressional interventions
undertaken without adherence to the constitutional requirements of
bicameralism and presentment.77 In dissent, Justice White rightly noted that
the constitutional text did not “directly . . . prohibit the legislative veto”
when issued pursuant to a law that itself had run the gauntlet of enactment
by both houses and submission to the President.78 The majority, however,
68

McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 328 n.9.
See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 488; accord Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1014
(noting that the analysis of Professors McGinnis and Rappaport focuses on what is “logically possible”);
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 241 (finding significance of the itemization in what the words
“necessarily mean” so as not to render them “superfluous”).
70
Bloch, supra note 3, at 4.
71
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002).
72
See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 11, at 527 n.95.
73
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (discussed infra note 84).
74
395 U.S. 486 (1969) (discussed infra note 85).
75
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
76
Id. at 944.
77
Id. at 967.
78
Id. at 977 (White, J., dissenting); accord, e.g., Bloch, supra note 3, at 2. For this reason,
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport gloss over an important complexity in asserting that “Chadha
provides no guidance” because there “the Constitution contain[ed] . . . a requirement” of bicameralism
and presentment. See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 492. The problem with this assertion
lies in its conclusory nature, because the whole question in Chadha was whether the Constitution
required bicameralism and presentment in the context of legislative vetoes. To repeat: the question in
Chadha was conceptually the same as the question presented here—namely, whether generally
applicable constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment had enough of a default-rule
character to permit Congress to remove those steps when acting pursuant to a previously enacted law.
69
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rejected the idea that Congress could empower itself to take later
unicameral action even in this distinctive setting, emphasizing in so ruling
that there are only “four provisions in the Constitution, explicit and
unambiguous, by which one House may act alone.”79
The underlying logic of the Any-Voting-Number Theory conflicts with
the underlying logic of Chadha. In that case, the Court did not focus solely
on inescapable logical necessity in evaluating the significance of the “four
provisions” on which it relied. If the Court had, it would have concluded
that the four-part enumeration signaled only that interpreters could not find
in the “Constitution itself” any fifth or sixth or seventh authorization of
unicameral legislative action.80 The Court, however, eschewed that route,
thus rejecting the narrow view of the expressio unius principle on which the
Any-Voting-Number Theory is built. According to the Court in Chadha,
because the text-based constitutional exceptions were “narrow, explicit, and
separately justified,” the claimed “[c]ongressional authority” to add to these
exceptions “is not to be implied.”81 The logic of Chadha applies here. The
Constitution’s specification of “carefully defined exceptions” to a generally
operative lawmaking norm—there, bicameralism and presentment; here,
majority voting—signals that subconstitutional creation of additional
exceptions is, as the Court declared in Chadha, “not authorized by the
constitutional design.”82
At the least, Chadha confirms the rightness of applying the expressio
unius principle with a high level of seriousness when efforts are made to
depart from standard lawmaking processes. And in light of that approach, it
is no small matter that four special reasons counsel application of the
expressio unius principle here. First, the Framers’ singling out of only a
circumscribed set of supermajority voting rules suggests on its face a plan
to mark out exceptions from how Congress will operate in ordinary
practice. According to the Any-Voting-Number Theory, however, the two
houses of Congress may craft supermajority voting rules that cover each
and every action they might take, thus causing the Framers’ exceptions not
79

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 (footnote omitted).
See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
81
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956 (emphasis added).
82
Id. This conclusion is confirmed by evidence drawn from the Philadelphia Convention itself. At
the Convention, John Dickinson specifically asserted that if the constitutional text were to set forth a
limited number of qualifications for holding office, such a “partial [list] would by implication tie up the
hands of the Legislature from supplying the omissions” in that list by later imposing additional
qualifications. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 123 (statement of John Dickinson). Particularly
because Dickinson was a leading lawyer of his day, see DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787:
THE MEN WHO INVENTED THE CONSTITUTION 33, 63 (2007), his understanding of the operation of the
expressio unius principle provides a strong indicator of the Constitution’s original meaning. And if a
limited listing of qualifications would “by implication” bar the houses of Congress from promulgating
additional qualifications, then there is good reason to conclude that a limiting listing of supermajority
voting requirements should likewise “by implication” bar the houses from promulgating additional
supermajority voting rules.
80
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to operate as exceptions at all.83 Second (as we have already seen), the case
for viewing the textual itemization as exclusive is bolstered by features of
the constitutional text that reach well beyond the enumeration itself.84 Third
(as we will soon see), the inference of exclusivity is reinforced in this
setting by a rich body of historical evidence.85
Finally, the matters that the Framers singled out for supermajority
voting requirements—such as presidential impeachment, constitutional
amendment, and expulsion of elected federal representatives—were self-

83

See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6 (1970) (describing our constitutional system, in light of the
five-case itemization of supermajority voting rules, as one in which “a simple majority vote is
insufficient on some issues” (emphasis added)).
84
See supra Part I.A, I.B. Among other things, this fact aligns the argument made here with the
reasoning of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). There, as Professor Van Alstyne has
famously observed, the Supreme Court could have easily read Article III’s listing of original-jurisdiction
cases as establishing only a default rule, such that Congress could add cases to that jurisdiction, just as it
had (in the Court’s view) in adopting the Judiciary Act of 1789. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 30–33. The Court, however, deemed the constitutional
listing not subject to congressional tinkering, relying on the combined effect of the expressio unius
principle and confirmatory implications it detected in the separate textual passage that treated the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Here, in similar fashion, implications from both the Presentment Clause
and the Vice President Voting Clause offer strong corroborative reasons to apply the expressio unius
principle with respect to supermajority voting rules. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 239
(acknowledging that application of expressio unius principle here is supported by the “Court’s reasoning
in Marbury”).
85
This fact renders the reasoning of Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), highly pertinent
here. There, the House refused to seat a recent election winner, Adam Clayton Powell, in part on the
ground that he had “wrongfully diverted House funds for the use of others and himself.” Id. at 492. The
House based this action on its textual power to “be the Judge of the Qualifications of its own Members.”
Id. at 521 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Powell argued
in response that the Qualifications Clause authorized exclusion only if the would-be member did not
meet the textually enumerated mandates of eligibility, including that he be at least twenty-five years old,
an American citizen for at least seven years, and a resident of the state from which he was elected. Id. at
537 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2). Proponents of exclusion responded that the Constitution
nowhere specified that the age, citizenship, residency, and other specifically enumerated requirements
(for example, not having been previously convicted on impeachment charges, see U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 3, cl. 6) were exclusive, so that the House could “supplement” these “minimum” requisites without the
need for a constitutional amendment. Powell, 395 U.S. at 557 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis
omitted). The Court, however, rejected this claim of “discretionary power” to make “additions” to the
constitutional listing, reasoning that the specific enumeration of membership requirements was
“unalterably” fixed. Id. at 534, 537 n.69, 546 n.84 (quoting 113 CONG. REC. 4998 (1967) (statement of
Rep. Emanuel Celler)) (internal quotation mark omitted). The Court based this conclusion on “the
records of the debates during the Constitutional Convention; available commentary from the postConvention, pre-ratification period; and early congressional applications of Art. I, § 5,” as well as “preConvention practices,” id. at 521–—that is, precisely the same forms of historical evidence collected and
relied on here. The resulting conclusion is straightforward: Just as surely as the Court’s expressio unius
treatment of listed member qualifications comported with “the basic principles of our democratic
system” in Powell, id. at 548, those same basic principles dictate that the houses of Congress may depart
from the rule of majority voting only in those instances where the Constitution itself requires the
exceptional act of supermajority decisionmaking.
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evidently extraordinary in character.86 The Any-Voting-Number Theory,
however, would permit either chamber to extend supermajority voting rules
to the enactment of any legislation, including the most inconsequential
private bills. Such a result clashes with both common practice and common
sense.87 No less important, it contradicts the conclusion drawn by the great
early treatise writer Justice Joseph Story, who found in the constitutional
text a clear indication that “departure from the general rule, of the right of a
majority to govern, ought not to be allowed but upon the most urgent
occasions.”88
All of these considerations support the conclusion that the
Constitution’s explicit itemization of five specialized supermajority rules
carries with it the implication that the houses of Congress may not freely
add more. And the broader trilogy of textual arguments—based on the
Presentment Clause, the Vice President Voting Clause, and the expressio
unius canon—provides an even sturdier textual foundation for concluding
that bills are “passed” if they receive a majority vote.
II. SUPERMAJORITY VOTING, CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, AND RULES
OF PROCEEDINGS
Advocates of the Any-Voting-Number Theory emphasize that sound
constitutional interpretation requires attentiveness to the document’s overall
“structure,” so as to interpret it “holistically,” rather than in a spirit of

86

See Remarks of George Clinton to the New York Convention (July 2, 1788), in 22
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 2058, 2071 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) (describing
the “principle” of the Framers as “in Matters great and Important to have the Concurrence of more than
a Majority”). See generally Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1014 (noting the obvious “weightiness of the
issues for which the Constitution provides supermajority requirements”); Benjamin Lieber & Patrick
Brown, Note, On Supermajorities and the Constitution, 83 GEO. L.J. 2347, 2376 (1995) (noting the
Framers’ plan to “avoid” supermajority voting “except in extraordinary circumstances”).
87
See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 45 (manuscript at 437–38) (suggesting that the Framers plainly
intended that constitutionally specified supermajority rules “were designed to be more demanding than
the simple majorities for ordinary statutes”).
88
2 STORY, supra note 45, § 887, at 354 (emphasis added). In the face of these considerations,
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport defend their tightfisted view of the expressio unius principle not by
relying on evidence from the framing period, but instead by invoking the Constitution’s Legislative
Journal and State of the Union Clauses. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 3. They write:
The Constitution requires each house to keep a journal, but no one would argue that this provision
disables each house from directing under its Rules of Proceedings Clause that other kinds of
records of its proceedings also be printed. The Constitution requires the President to report on the
“State of the Union,” but no one would argue that he is constitutionally disabled from sending
messages to Congress on other subjects.
McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 488 (footnotes omitted). This argument is inapposite, because
not one of the four considerations identified here—concerning itemization of multiple exceptions, the
presence of confirmatory text, the role of corroborative history, and the Framers’ obvious effort to single
out special cases for special treatment—applies, even weakly, to hypotheticals built on the
Constitution’s treatment of legislative journals and State of the Union messages.
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“linguistic isolation.”89 They are right to advocate this approach.90 But they
misstep in applying it. We already have seen, for example, why the AnyVoting-Number Theory raises tensions with Article I’s presentment-andoverride lawmaking system and the Framers’ grant to the Vice President of
a tiebreaking vote. Other structural difficulties will come into view when
we turn to the history of the framing. One structural problem, however, is
so significant that it merits immediate attention. The difficulty is that the
Any-Voting-Number Theory is at war with itself.
The inherent tension arises because that theory posits, and even
depends on, its own structural principle of legislative majoritarianism;
indeed, it posits two such principles. First, adherents of the Any-VotingNumber Theory acknowledge that legislative majoritarianism is a “default
rule” that always controls, absent contrary specification by House or Senate
Rule.91 This default rule, however, is not set forth in the constitutional text;
rather, it emanates from nontextual premises that support majority
decisionmaking. Put another way, Any-Voting-Number Theory proponents
recognize that structural extrapolation of one important majority-based
voting rule is entirely uncontroversial. The question presented here is thus
revealed to be a focused one. It does not concern great battles over
textualism versus atextualism, nor over disciplined versus free-form
constitutional interpretation. Rather, the relevant question concerns which
of the two types of majority voting rules is more sensibly attributed to the
Framers in the absence of a totally explicit textual treatment: a default rule
of legislative majoritarianism or a fixed rule of legislative majoritarianism.
All the arguments offered above and below demonstrate that the fixed rule
fits best with the Framers’ original plan.
The second principle of legislative majoritarianism embraced by
advocates of Any-Voting-Number Theory exposes their approach to even
greater difficulties. The defense of Rule XXI(5)(c) offered by Professors
McGinnis and Rappaport rests on the underlying premise that the House
must retain “ultimate power” to repeal that rule, or any supermajority
voting rule, by way of majority vote.92 In other words, the promulgation of a
supermajority rule for votes on bills is constitutionally acceptable only
because it “involves a majority imposing a supermajority requirement upon
itself until the majority decides to eliminate it.”93 Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport thus endorse both a default-rule norm of legislative
89

See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 346–47.
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (looking, in the absence of textual
determinacy, for interpretive guidance “in the structure of the Constitution”); McGinnis & Rappaport II,
supra note 6, at 347 n.89 (noting Blackstone’s support of arguments from structure).
91
McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 488.
92
Roberts, supra note 11, at 530 n.105; accord id. at 529–31 (endorsing the principle of “ultimate
majority control” and ascribing the same view to McGinnis and Rappaport).
93
McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 491.
90
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majoritarianism and a fixed non-default-rule norm of legislative
majoritarianism. In a critical move, however, they define the latter norm as
one that requires only that the House or Senate not depart from the value of
legislative majority rule too much.
But how much is too much? Professors McGinnis and Rappaport, for
example, state that their ultimate-control principle permits the House to
pass a three-fifths supermajority voting rule (Rule 1) together with another
rule under which Rule 1 is itself repealable only by a supermajority vote
(Rule 2).94 They say that this arrangement works, however, only because “a
majority could simply pass resolutions that repealed the repeal rule and the
three-fifths rule” at the same time.95 But what if the House could not act in
this way? What if, for example, Rule 2 was itself repealable under yet
another rule (Rule 3) by only a three-fourths vote? And what if another
House rule (Rule 4) barred near-in-time repeals of Rule 1, Rule 2, and Rule
3? Professors McGinnis and Rappaport acknowledge that “[i]t is not clear
what limitations, if any, the Constitution imposes on a chamber’s power to
prevent a majority from obtaining a vote on a measure” that imposes a
supermajority rule.96 They also acknowledge “that the chambers cannot
have unlimited discretion to pass rules that regulate the opportunity to hold
votes, because some versions of such rules function like extreme insulated
repeal rules.”97 But what versions of what rules fall victim to this limit? Are
our hypothetical Rules 3 and 4 invalid because they are “extreme insulated
repeal rules”? And, why, more fundamentally, would we suppose that the
Framers meant to protect a concededly irreducible norm of legislative
majoritarianism only in such a circuitous and conceptually knotty way?98
The proper answer to these questions is suggested by Hamilton’s
admonition that “a spirit of . . . too great abstraction and refinement” may
“lead men astray from the plainest paths of reason.”99 If in fact an
irreducible principle of legislative majoritarianism inheres in the
Constitution (as promoters of the Any-Voting-Number Theory concede),
that principle should embody “the most obvious, easy, and natural criterion

94

Id. at 503–07.
Id. at 503–04.
96
Id. at 507 n.117.
97
Id. at 508 n.117.
98
Consider, for example, the question presented if the Senate had passed Rule XXI(5)(c). That rule
would be repealable (in theory) by majority vote. But debate on changing the rule could itself be stopped
only by a supermajority vote—indeed, a 67% cloture vote, rather than the usual 60% vote—because the
matter would concern a rule change, rather than an ordinary bill. See U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES &
ADMIN., supra note 20, at 20 (Rule XXII). To be sure, this supermajority cloture rule would be
repealable (in theory) by majority vote, but some form of the rule in fact now has stood for nearly a
century. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 194–95. Would this arrangement offend the
“ultimate power” requirement? Who knows?
99
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, supra note 9, at 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
95
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of determination”100—namely, that the vote of a majority is determinative in
passing all ordinary legislation.101
Looking at the Constitution through a broader lens confirms this
conclusion. The Framers’ work centered on constructing an intricate
balance of powers among the three federal branches and between the nation
and the states. The crafting of this balance involved the use of a rich array
of techniques: creating different branches, dividing the legislature into two
houses, giving each power center different but overlapping authority,
providing differing modes of selection and different terms of office for
members of each branch and each congressional chamber, and divvying up
authority between federal and state officials in complex ways that permitted
each group to serve as a watchdog of the other.102 Of special importance,
particularly to James Madison, was the channeling of increased authority to
the far-reaching national governing unit. This move, Madison predicted,
would foster the selection of the most qualified legislators and impede the
too-ready implementation of plans of factional oppression.103 Through all of
these means, and others as well, the Framers created a complex equilibrium
of powers, meticulously designed to ensure that no arm of government
would have too much or too little strength.
The Framers’ intricate architecture, however, becomes subject to
radical alteration if the House and the Senate can freely put in place
supermajority bill-passing voting rules. Supermajority rules adopted by the
Senate, for example, steal power away from the House by making
legislative initiatives of the lower chamber far more difficult to transform
into binding law. In similar fashion, supermajority rules of the House dilute
the policymaking power of the Senate—an outcome that likewise
contravenes the Framers’ attempt to establish a system in which “equal
authority . . . will subsist between the two houses on all legislative
subjects.”104 Supermajority rules, whether promulgated by the House or the
Senate, truncate executive authority by constricting the President’s ability
to pursue new programs and to wield the threat of the veto power in
100

Letter from An Impartial Citizen V to the Petersburg Virginia Gazette (Feb. 28, 1788), in 8
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 428, 432–33 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
1988) (specifically endorsing this approach in defense of a rule of recognition “fixed upon a majority of
voices” in the legislative chamber).
101
See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 87 (noting the oddity of the position of advocates of the AnyVoting-Number Theory that “majority rule is to be read into [the Rules of Proceedings Clause] despite
the Constitution’s silence on the subject, whereas it must not be read into [the Presentment Clause]
because of the Constitution’s silence on the subject”); see also Bloch, supra note 3, at 5 (also
emphasizing this point); infra notes 190–96 and accompanying text (emphasizing relative simplicity and
workability of fixed majority-voting-on-bills approach).
102
See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 7–8
(Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES].
103
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 9, at 60–61 (James Madison).
104
THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 9, at 393 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
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bargaining over changes to legislation. Supermajority rules also can create
de facto legislative immunities for states, by broadly protecting them from
preemption of their laws or other meddlesome forms of federal control. The
bottom line is that permitting promulgation of these rules creates an
opening for far-reaching alterations of the Constitution’s basic allocation of
governing powers.105
Defenders of the Any-Voting-Number Theory have an answer to this
big-picture critique. They say, in effect, that the authority to self-impose
supermajority voting rules is itself one component of the Framers’ intricate
tapestry of blended powers.106 They argue in particular that the Framers
endorsed the supermajority-vote-checking mechanism by vesting in each
house of Congress the power to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”107
We will soon see why this argument overlooks the Framers’ understandings
of how legislative majoritarianism fits together with republican self-rule
and other core values embraced in the constitutional plan.108 There is,
however, a more immediate problem with this argument: it places on the
narrow shoulders of the Rules of Proceedings Clause more weight than the
Clause can carry. Indeed, as we have seen, that theory attributes to this
once-little-noticed provision—the words of which plainly focus on internal
matters of procedural self-regulation—a large, if not transformative, role in
105

See Bloch, supra note 3, at 2–4 (emphasizing the “distorting impact adding supermajority
requirements can have on the other branches”); King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 176–77;
Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 79. In a related vein, self-imposed supermajority voting rules clash with the
Framers’ design to give “plenary” authority to Congress to pursue the purposes entrusted to it by Article
I. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 46 (1824). In particular, the Framers chose to vest Congress with
“ample means” to wield “ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of
the nation so vitally depends.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 408 (1819). In speaking of federal
taxes, for example, Alexander Hamilton wrote that “future necessities admit not of calculation or
limitation,” so that “the power of making provision for them as they arise, ought to be . . . unconfined.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, supra note 9, at 190 (Alexander Hamilton). It is not easy to square an
“unconfined” taxing authority with the validity of House and Senate rules that systematically do confine
the enactment of taxing measures by requiring all such measures to secure a supermajority vote. This
argument, moreover, is not merely an extrapolation distilled from snippets of the historical record.
Hamilton himself effectively advanced the same proposition at the New York Ratification Convention.
See Remarks of Alexander Hamilton to the New York Convention (July 2, 1788), in 22 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 62, at 2058, 2072 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) (excoriating Antifederalist
demands for a two-thirds-vote requirement for congressional borrowing because “we ought not do any
thing to impede a Loan when necessary” and “especially” when “the Gen[era]l defence is concerned”);
see also 1 STORY, supra note 45, § 330, at 299 (“[T]he majority must have a right to accomplish that
object by the means, which they deem adequate for the end.”).
106
See, e.g., Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 244–45. In a related form of structural
argument, Professors Fisk and Chemerinsky expend much energy seeking to prove that “majoritarianism
is not a universal principle of American government.” Id. That is true, see, e.g., supra notes 63–67 and
accompanying text, but beside the point. The question here is not about a “universal principle”; instead,
it is about the proper meaning to associate with the word “passed” in Article I, Section 7, in light of a
sweeping range of textual, structural, and historical arguments.
107
U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 2.
108
See infra Part III.
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the constitutional allocation of government powers.109 Not one shred of
evidence from the framing era, however, supports the attribution of such an
intention to the Framers. To the contrary, the historical record indicates that
the Clause drew no attention at all in the Philadelphia assembly, at any of
the ratification conventions, or at any time in between.110 And it simply is
not easy to believe that the Framers meant the Rules of Proceedings Clause
to carry with it a power to reframe the overall structure of state and federal
powers, when not one speaker in any of these settings deemed it
consequential enough to merit even a passing comment.
Ascribing to the Rules of Proceedings Clause this critical role is further
undermined by another consideration: close inspection reveals that the
provision is best viewed as having no independent significance in
interpreting the scope of the federal legislative authority. As Joseph Story
explained in his own terse account of the clause, it has a “propriety” that
“[n]o person can doubt,” because even “[t]he humblest assembly of men is
understood to possess [the] power” to make rules for their internal
operation.111 Without that power, after all, “it would be utterly
impracticable” for a legislature “to transact . . . business . . . either at all, or
at least with decency, deliberation, and order.”112 Put another way, it is with
the Rules of Proceedings Clause as it is, for example, with the President’s
expressly granted authority to seek opinions from cabinet members.113
These powers naturally flowed to the relevant government decisionmakers,
and their existence was merely reaffirmed by the constitutional text.114
Viewed from this vantage point, the controlling constitutional question
appears in a clearer light: Did a power to abandon deeply rooted norms of
109

See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Leach, supra note 52, at 1257 n.10 (noting the absence of the Rules of Proceedings
Clause in early drafts of the Constitution and the delegates’ later agreement to it “without discussion”);
Roberts, supra note 11, at 532 (noting that the Rules of Proceedings Clause “apparently was not debated
by the Convention” and “was not addressed in The Federalist” or “a subject of controversy during the
state ratification debates”).
111
2 STORY, supra note 45, § 835, at 298.
112
Id.
113
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
114
See Roberts, supra note 11, at 531–32 (noting that Rules of Proceedings Clause “apparently was
not debated” because it appears “[o]n its face” to be a “truism” and “beyond controversy,” that it was
“probably deemed too obvious to be discussed,” and that “[a]ll legislative bodies . . . formulate and
adopt rules governing their proceedings as soon as possible after convening”). To be sure, one might
object to this interpretation on the theory that it renders the Rules of Proceedings Clause mere
surplusage. The Framers, however, recognized that some clauses of the Constitution were to work in
exactly the same power-confirmatory way. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 9, at 204–06
(Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause “are only
declaratory of a truth, which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the
very act of constituting a Fœderal Government”; adding that “the constitutional operation of the
intended government would be precisely the same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated”; but also
observing that they were nonetheless included “for greater caution” so as to “leave nothing to
construction”).
110
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majority decisionmaking, to establish all manner of submajority and
supermajority voting rules, and thus to meddle with the basic structures of
governance, devolve upon each chamber of Congress not by way of express
textual grant but by implication from those bodies’ mere existence? Or, to
build on Justice Story’s thought, did the inherent power of each body to
promulgate rules to facilitate internal “decency, deliberation, and order”
carry along with it a de facto capacity to recalibrate the Constitution’s
otherwise-controlling allocations of power among the House, Senate,
President, and states? To discover such an implied authority requires an
inventiveness of impressive proportions.115
There is another difficulty as well. Even if the Rules of Proceedings
Clause does have an independent power-conferring significance, the
Framers’ chosen phrase, “Rules of . . . Proceedings,” on its face suggests a
contrast with “Rules of Decision”—in much the same way that lawmakers
often place “procedural law” and “substantive law” into mutually exclusive
categories.116 Building on this idea, it merits emphasis that the Framers
never suggested that a proper goal of the Rules of Proceedings Clause was
to go beyond procedural self-regulation, in a manner that permitted the
House and Senate to tilt the legislative scales in a significant way for or
against particular substantive outcomes—to make it hard to pass tax laws,
to make it easy to pass pay increases, or to make it deeply difficult to alter
as a general matter any feature of the legal landscape. For these reasons,
one must strain to find in that Clause even standing alone—that is, even
ignoring altogether any external, overriding norm of majority voting—a
font of implied authority to self-impose supermajority voting rules.117
The Court’s ruling in Cook v. Gralike118 supports this view. That case
involved the question whether a state could disadvantage candidates for
federal office who failed to follow state instructions to back term-limit
reform by prominently flagging that fact on the ballot.119 The state argued
that it could take this action pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate
the “Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.”120 The
Court, however, rejected this argument. In its view, the Elections Clause
115

See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 87 (urging that Any-Voting-Number Theory advocates “want to
take the clause that, naturally enough, confers upon each legislative chamber authority over its own
parliamentary proceedings and turn it into something more: a power within each chamber fundamentally
to disrupt the basic structure of national lawmaking”).
116
See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1941).
117
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956 n.21 (1983) (describing congressional rule-making
authority as involving only “a closely circumscribed legislative arena”).
118
531 U.S. 510 (2001).
119
In particular, Missouri law specified that the legend “DISREGARDED VOTERS’
INSTRUCTIONS ON TERM LIMITS” or “DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS”
be printed on ballots near the names of noncomplying candidates. Id. at 514–15 & 514 n.2 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
120
Id. at 513, 522 (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1).
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was only “a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not . . . a
source of power to . . . favor or disfavor a class of candidates.”121 The Court
also went on to conclude that the “political disadvantage” imposed on termlimit-opposing office seekers by the unflattering ballot notice caused the
rule to fall into the substantive, rather than the procedural, camp.122
This holding stands in obvious tension with rules that mandate
supermajority support to pass certain categories of bills. On the reasoning
of Cook, these rules reach well beyond such “procedural” matters as the
sequencing of balloting, the duration of debating periods, and the form of
“making and publication” of votes.123 Rather, they impose a “disadvantage”
on a class of bills, just as surely as the rule in Cook imposed a
“disadvantage” on “a class of candidates.”124 Indeed, while “the precise
damage” the ballot labels caused was “disputed” in Cook,125 the resulttilting consequence of supermajority voting rules is unmistakably—even
numerically—clear. Under the logic of Cook, these rules thus do not merely
“regulat[e] . . . procedural mechanisms.”126 As a result, they may well be
ultra vires because the Rules of Proceedings Clause, just like the Elections
Clause as interpreted in Cook, focuses on creating “procedures for internal
governance.”127
Proponents of the Any-Voting-Number Theory might respond to this
challenge by claiming that supermajority voting rules are simply not a big
deal. This response again builds on the underlying premise of that theory—
namely, that the House and the Senate always remain free to repeal
supermajority voting rules by majority vote.128 In particular, so the argument
goes, supermajority voting rules neither threaten constitutional structures
nor dictate substantive results because the “ultimate power” of legislative
majorities to displace them always remains in the hands of each chamber.129
The lesser problem with this line of reasoning is that it rests on near selfcontradiction. Put simply, it makes little sense for constitutional
121

Id. at 523 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833–34
(1995)).
122
Id. at 525–26.
123
Id. at 523–24 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)).
124
Id. at 525; see id. at 516 (quoting Gralike v. Cook, 996 F. Supp. 901, 910 (W.D. Mo. 1988), as
reading the state rule as creating “the threat of being disadvantaged in the election”).
125
Id. at 525.
126
Id. at 526; see also McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 497 (describing as “substantive”
the question of “[h]ow much influence should a legislative minority have over the content of
legislation”).
127
Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 18, at 253 (statement of Professor Gerhardt) (emphasis added).
For variations on this line of argument, see Open Letter, supra note 6, at 1542; Bloch, supra note 3, at 2;
and Lieber & Brown, supra note 86, at 2362 (arguing that Rule XXI(5)(c) “appears calculated to achieve
a substantive result backed by the current majority”).
128
See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 484.
129
See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
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decisionmakers to fend off powerful textual, structural, and historical
arguments so as to sustain such rules on the ground that they have no realworld significance. After all, if they had no real-world significance, they
would hardly be worthy of defense.
The larger problem with the argument is that supermajority voting
rules are a big deal. At least as a general matter, lawmakers adopt rules so
that they will have effects, not so that they will fade into nothingness, and
this is surely the case with supermajority voting requirements. Professors
McGinnis and Rappaport recognize the practical impact of these rules,
notwithstanding their posited exposure to “ultimate” majority control.130
And all doubts fall away when one considers the present-day Senate. Why?
Because, as one seasoned Senator recently observed, the effect of that
body’s supermajoritarian filibuster rule—even if technically repealable by
majority vote—is so profound that it makes it “all but impossible to conduct
everyday business.”131 In short, because supermajority voting rules can and
do have broad on-the-ground consequences, any structural defense of them
based on their supposed lack of importance stands on feet of clay.
Recognizing the significant effects of supermajority voting rules
suggests another structural reason for finding them inconsistent with the
constitutional plan. This is so because, with regard to important legislative
decisions, the Framers insisted on the use of bicameralism and presentment,
or parallel safeguards, to ensure high levels of institutional care. If the
power to make supermajority voting rules stems from the Rules of
Proceedings Clause, however, such rules may be promulgated with neither
bicameralism nor presentment nor anything like them because that
Clause—in keeping with its limited internal-procedure-related purposes—
permits each house to act without the other. Can it be that the Framers
meant that voting rules of key significance in the lawmaking process are the
proper subject of adoption not only in the absence of constitutional
amendment, but by a house of Congress acting entirely on its own? The
core structural theme of strong checks and balances conjoins with text and
history to signal that the answer to this question is “no.”
130

See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 345–46 (emphasizing that supermajority voting
rules “cannot be dismissed as merely hortatory” but instead have “real world effects,” that “[t]he
repealability of a rule does not in general make it ineffective,”; that supermajority rules at least
“represent a public precommitment by the majority to a policy,” and that this precommitment “makes it
more politically costly” to repeal the supermajority voting rule than “to simply vote for a tax increase”);
see also, e.g., King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 190–91; King, Use of Supermajority, supra
note 6, at 404 (noting “the inherent inertial power of supermajority provisions”); Roberts, supra note 11,
at 519 (noting that supermajority rules, even if subject to majority-vote change, are not “useless” in part
because “they represent Congress’s effort to discipline itself”); id. at 530 (reiterating that such rules
foster “stability”); id. at 538 (noting that Senate’s supermajority Cloture Rule “exerts a strong pull,”
even if repealable at any time as a theoretical matter).
131
Tom Harkin, Fixing the Filibuster, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2010, 10:39 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/sen-tom-harkin/fixing-the-filibuster_b_459969.html.
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III. SUPERMAJORITY VOTING RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
As Parts I and II show, many textual and structural considerations
show that the Any-Voting-Number Theory does not fare well under a fullscale originalist analysis. And as it turns out, a close look at the conditions
and events of 1787 and 1788 strongly confirms the same conclusion.
Indeed, four separate elements of that history indicate that the Framers
intended for Congress to engage in lawmaking only by majority vote. Those
elements are: (1) the uniform acceptance at the time of parliamentary
practice under which majorities controlled legislative action absent contrary
constitutional specification, (2) then-dominant philosophical commitments
to principles of republicanism that insisted on majority-based lawmaking,
(3) the experience-driven goal of the delegates and ratifiers to abandon
supermajority voting methods because those very methods had rendered the
Confederation Congress highly ineffectual, and (4) the crafting of key
political compromises at the Philadelphia Convention, including the Great
Compromise, which supermajority voting rules offend. These four
considerations, especially in combination, offer a compelling case for
concluding that the Any-Voting-Number Theory lacks sound support.
A. Background Norms of Parliamentary Practice
1. Settled Understandings.—Does our Constitution establish simplemajority voting, to the exclusion of supermajority voting, as the proper
manner of enacting ordinary laws, absent a contrary constitutional
command? The issue is neither novel nor new. A unanimous Supreme
Court addressed this very question in 1892 and came down emphatically on
the side of mandatory majority decisionmaking. In United States v.
Ballin,132 the Court wrote:
[T]he general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is
present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body. This has
been the rule for all time, except so far as in any given case the terms of the
organic act under which the body is assembled have prescribed specific
limitations. . . . No such limitation is found in the Federal Constitution, and
therefore the general law of such bodies obtains.133

This pronouncement does not say that the Constitution establishes
legislative majority voting as only a “default rule” that the legislature (far
less, one house of the legislature) can alter. It states that majority voting is
the operative “rule for all time” unless there is an exception set forth in the
“organic act” under which the legislature is organized—that is, “the Federal
Constitution.” Put another way, the Court in Ballin declared that a majority
vote is always decisive in passing laws because, in contrast to provisions
132
133
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such as the Treaty Clause or Senate Impeachment Clause, the provisions of
the Constitution that deal with the passage of laws do not dictate a rule of
supermajority approval.134
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport recognize that “at first glance”
their position contravenes the Court’s pronouncement in Ballin.135 They go
on, however, to question the significance of that pronouncement, reasoning
that it embodies only a nonbinding dictum because the question in the case
focused on quorum requirements rather than supermajority voting rules.136
Precisely because Ballin concerned the Rules of Proceedings Clause,
however, it is unlikely that the Court failed to have the nature and limits of
that Clause in plain view. Indeed, the Court framed the issue before it not in
terms of quorum rules, but in these telling terms: “[W]hat is necessary to
constitute the official action of this legislative and representative body”?137
All of this matters, but lurking in the background is a deeper and more
important point. Even if the declaration in Ballin had been pure obiter, the
Court said what it said because, for the Justices, it was obvious and
uncontroversial. Put simply, the Court concluded without difficulty that
Congress had to engage in lawmaking by way of majority-based voting.138
With this thought in view, it is worth asking a simple question: If the
background understanding of a unanimous Supreme Court in 1892 was that
bills have “passed” so long as they have received a majority vote, why
should we suppose that that was not the background understanding of the
Framers in 1787 and 1788? Professors McGinnis and Rappaport point to no
intervening legal developments that could have led the Court to take a
radically different view of how legislatures operate than was taken by the
Framers themselves. These skilled analysts point to no previously
unavailable evidence drawn from the Convention or ratification debates that
134

A near-century later, the Court reiterated that “the Constitution’s prescription for legislative
action” is “passage by a majority of both Houses,” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983), and
alluded without equivocation to “the simple majority required for passage of legislation.” Id. at 956
n.21.
135
McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 492–93. Even so, they go on to float the idea that “the
better interpretation” of the statement in Ballin is that the Court meant to set forth only a “default rule”
that permits self-imposition of supermajority voting rules. Id. at 493. The language of Ballin is there for
all to see and a default-rule translation is (to say the least) not easy to reconcile with the Court’s
declaration that “the rule” of majority voting applies “except” when there are “prescribed specific
limitations” on majority voting “in the Federal Constitution” itself. Id. at 492–93 (quoting Ballin, 144
U.S. at 6).
136
Id. at 493 (asserting that the question of self-imposed supermajority voting rules was “neither
discussed in the opinion nor raised by the facts of the case”).
137
Ballin, 144 U.S. at 7.
138
The Court in Ballin did not stand alone in this regard. Indeed, one then-leading treatise writer on
American constitutional law had previously expressed exactly the same view. See THOMAS M. COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF
THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 141 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868) (“A simple majority of a
quorum is sufficient, unless the [C]onstitution establishes some other rule . . . .”).

1119

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

contradicts the view of legislative operations endorsed by nine Justices in
Ballin.
In fact, the historical record confirms the Ballin Court’s conclusion in
the strongest way. At the time of the framing, the English Parliament had
always and only acted through majority voting.139 State legislative practice
was likewise universally rooted in the norm of majoritarian
decisionmaking.140 The Philadelphia Convention and each of the thirteen
state ratification conventions themselves acted according to the principle of
majority, not supermajority, rule.141 The early House and Senate passed all
139

See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 77 (“Majority rule was . . . the established practice of the
British Parliament . . . .”); McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 341 (“[M]ajority rule did govern
the British Parliament . . . .”). See generally Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 766 (1996)
(“[E]vents of the English constitutional experience . . . were familiar to [the Framers] and inform our
understanding of the purpose and meaning of constitutional provisions.”); McGinnis & Rappaport II,
supra note 6, at 348 (emphasizing, albeit in another context, that “[h]istory . . . helps resolve ambiguities
because the Constitution established its system of political governance against the backdrop of the
English Constitution—itself a distillation of established practices”).
140
See King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 178 (“[T]here has yet to be offered an
example of where a rule analogous to . . . House Rule [XXI(5)(c)]—a rule in which a legislative body
adopts for itself a supermajority requirement on certain substantive legislation—has ever been used
by . . . any of the original thirteen Colonial legislatures or in any established parliamentary body
preceding the adoption of the Constitution.”); see also AMAR, supra note 45 (“[N]either Parliament nor
any state circa 1787 generally required more than simple house majority votes for the passage of bills or
the adoption of internal house procedures, even though in many of these states no explicit clause
explicitly specified this voting rule. In America circa 1787, majority rule in these contexts thus truly did
go without saying.”). This idea was captured during the ratification period itself. See Letter from An
Independent Freeholder to the Winchester Virginia Gazette (Jan. 25, 1788), in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY supra note 62, at 325, 325–26 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) (“I can
conceive no reason why the ordinary business of legislation should not be determined in Congress by a
majority of voices as is done in all our assemblies, and other public bodies.” (emphasis added)).
Consistent with this history, it was also the case that “simple majority vote by colony was used to decide
matters” during the 1770s in the Continental Congress. CALVIN JILLSON & RICK K. WILSON,
CONGRESSIONAL DYNAMICS: STRUCTURE, COORDINATION AND CHOICE IN THE FIRST AMERICAN
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 53 (1994).
141
With respect to the state ratifying conventions, each one operated according to “simple majority
rule.” See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty,
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 750 (1994); id. at 764 (noting
that Madison observed in THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 that states would act in this manner); see also AMAR,
supra note 45 (manuscript at 70) (adding that state conventions acted in this manner even though “the
federal Constitution’s text contained not a single word specifying majority rule as the proper metric,”
and that majority rule in this context “[e]vidently . . . went without saying”). Indeed, state ratification
conventions adopted simple majority rule even in settings where “pre-existing state constitutions could
plausibly have been construed to require something more than a simple majority vote.” Id. Even against
this backdrop, however, no hue and cry—or even a whisper of objection—over majority-based voting
was raised. Rather, as Professor Amar has documented, leading opponents of the Constitution repeatedly
emphasized the need, under established principles, for the minority to accede to the vote of the majority
of the body. Id. at 72. For example, Patrick Henry, who bitterly opposed the proposed Constitution,
bluntly observed at the hard-fought Virginia Ratification Convention that “[i]f this be the opinion of the
majority, I must submit.” Remarks of Patrick Henry to the Virginia Convention (June 5, 1788), in 9
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 943, 956 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
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laws by way of majority vote,142 and in fact they unwaveringly adhered to
that practice until Rule XXI(5)(c) took hold in 1975.143 The records of the
Philadelphia Convention and the follow-up ratification process contain not
one statement by one person that even hints that the houses of Congress
could impose on themselves supermajority voting rules.144 On the other
hand, those records contain many statements that presuppose or endorse
majority voting on bills.145 James Madison captured the mood at the
1990). All of this underscores the deep-seated commitment at the time to majority voting by
parliamentary bodies, at least absent a contrary signal in an extraordinary form of background law.
142
See Roberts, supra note 11, at 525.
143
See Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting the statement of the clerk of the
House of Representatives that “[t]he House has never failed to deem passed a bill that has received the
support of a simple majority”); King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 178 (asserting that the
supermajority-to-pass-a-bill approach had “never been part of either the House or the Senate” until
adoption of Rule XXI(5)(c)). See generally supra note 10 (collecting additional authorities). This
consistent practice of not acting pursuant to a supposed congressional power—especially for many years
immediately following the nation’s founding—tellingly illuminates the original meaning of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (interpreting the Constitution in
light of the enactments of the earliest Congresses). This same view of the Constitution’s meaning also
comports with the persistent centrality of majority voting throughout the politics of our nation, which
has been noted by both the Supreme Court and others. See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE
PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 296–97, 369 (2010) (noting early opposition to
nonmajority voting requirements, and detailing a number of votes leading up to New York’s ratification
of the Constitution, all of which were decided by majority vote). The centrality of majoritarianism has,
both wisely and unsurprisingly, continued to be a key theme throughout American history. See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964) (“[T]he democratic ideals of equality and majority
rule . . . have served this Nation so well in the past . . . .”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1980) (describing majority rule as “the core of the
American governmental system”).
144
See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH,
POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?: FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 33 (1997) (“The records of the
convention and the arguments in the Federalist Papers give no indication that the framers either
anticipated or desired procedural protection for Senate minorities.”). This point is of particular
significance because the Supreme Court has declared that such omissions are helpful in ferreting out
original meaning. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 812 (1995) (“We . . . find
compelling the complete absence in the ratification debates of any assertion that States had the power to
add qualifications [for federal representatives].”).
145
See, e.g., Letter from An Impartial Citizen to the Petersburg Virginia Gazette (Jan. 10, 1788), in
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 293, 295 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
1988) (“The Executive has . . . no absolute negative on the laws, but a power of preventing the passing a
law by a bare majority . . . .” (emphasis added)); Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Oct.
10, 1787), in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 30, 30–31 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1983) (“[T]he house of representatives, the democrative branch, as it is called, is to
consist of 65 members . . . . Thirty-three representatives will make a quorum for doing business, and a
majority of those present determine the sense of the house.”); Remarks of James Wilson to the
Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 487, 493
(listing as one reason for adopting the Constitution that “[e]verything almost is transacted by a majority.
The minority do not govern.”); The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention
of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 62, at 13, 26 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) (“The house of
representatives is to consist of 65 members . . . . Thirty-three members will form a quorum for doing
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Virginia Ratification Convention when he lit into late-blooming
Antifederalist proposals to tack additional supermajority voting rules onto
the Constitution. As he declared:
This policy of guarding against political inconveniences, by enabling a small
part of the community to oppose the Government, and subjecting the majority
to a small minority is fallacious. In some cases it may be good; in others it may
be fatal. In all cases it puts it in the power of the minority to decide a question
which concerns the majority.146

Statements to the same effect came from such luminaries as Alexander
Hamilton147 and James Wilson,148 “one of the Constitution’s two most
important Framers, and the leading lawyer in America.”149 Perhaps the most
telling observation came from the wise and worldly Benjamin Franklin,
who reminded his fellow delegates that supermajority voting rules were
“contrary to the common practice of Assemblies in all Countries and
Ages.”150
To be sure, as Professors McGinnis and Rappaport emphasize, the
Articles of Confederation required supermajority votes for the preConstitution Congress to act in important areas.151 But, consistent with the
business; and 17 of these, being the majority, determine the sense of the house. . . . [In the Senate]
fourteen senators make a quorum; the majority of whom, eight, determines the sense of that body:
except in judging on impeachments, or in making treaties, or in expelling a member, when two thirds of
the senators present, must concur.”); see also Letter from Antoine de la Forest, French Vice Consul for
the United States, to Comte de Montmorin, French Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Marine
(Sept. 28, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 259, 260 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (noting, in describing the House of Representatives, that “in it a majority
of individuals, and no longer that of States, will decide all questions”); see generally infra notes 156,
199–217, 230–31, 248–61 and accompanying text (collecting various additional statements).
146
Remarks of James Madison to the Virginia Convention (June 24, 1788), in 10 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 62, at 1473, 1503 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993). As
Madison’s statement highlights, untempered endorsement of majoritarian lawmaking surfaced not only
at the Philadelphia Convention, but in the ratification proceedings as well. For example, in both Virginia
and New York, focused proposals to require supermajority votes on such matters as regulating
commerce and borrowing money were pushed forward. In response, key Federalists—in particular,
Madison, Hamilton, and John Jay—decried these initiatives as unjust and action-stifling tools of
minority control. See MAIER, supra note 143, at 297, 367–69.
147
See infra notes 216–17, 251–61 and accompanying text.
148
See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
149
Amar, supra note 141, at 765.
150
1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 198 (statement of Benjamin Franklin). Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport have noted that “[w]hen the Framers drafted the Constitution, they did so against a traditional
understanding of the limits of legislative power.” McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 505. That is
right. And so it follows that the Framers did not envision—precisely because of this “traditional
understanding”—that the legislative power could not be made subject to a scattershot array, far less the
uniform application, of self-imposed submajority and supermajority voting rules.
151
See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 341 n.65 (citing ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
OF 1781, art. IX, para. 6, which required a 9-of-13 vote to take such actions as engaging in war, entering
into treaties, and coining, borrowing, or appropriating money).
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principle of Ballin, the Articles constituted the “organic law” under which
that Congress was organized. And no evidence suggests that the
Confederation Congress could have or would have sought to impose
supermajority voting rules on itself in areas other than those specified in the
Articles themselves.152 In any event, the essential objective of the framing
was to get rid of the Articles—and to do so in large part (as we soon shall
see) precisely because the supermajority voting constraints they imposed
created far-reaching problems. Put simply, at least when it comes to an
endorsement of supermajority voting rules, there is no basis for reasoning
by analogy from legislative practice under the Articles to how the Framers
meant their radically new Constitution to operate.
Pronouncements of leading thinkers of the time confirm that the
Framers intended that the chambers of Congress would have to act on bills
by majority vote. In his Second Treatise on Government, for example, John
Locke asserted—in words directly foreshadowing Ballin—that “in
assemblies impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by
that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for
the act of the whole, and, of course, determines, as having by the law of
nature and reason the power of the whole.”153 The same view was voiced by
Thomas Jefferson, “the great parliamentarian of the early Republic.”154
Tracking Locke, Jefferson invoked “natural law,” “common law,” and
“common right”155 to posit that:
The first principle of republicanism is, that the lex-majoris partis is the
fundamental law of every society of individuals of equal rights; to consider the
152

Indeed, the Articles expressly indicated that, absent specification of a supermajority rule, action
would be determined by “the votes of a majority of the United States in Congress assembled.” ARTICLES
OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 6. Professors McGinnis and Rappaport seek to turn this
language to their advantage by saying the omission of similar language from the Constitution signaled a
design to permit self-imposed supermajority and submajority bill-voting rules. McGinnis & Rappaport
II, supra note 6, at 342 n.67, 347. This argument lacks force, however, because it seeks to draw a
parallel where no basis for doing so exists. Why did the Framers fail to include what could have been
only roughly comparable language in the Constitution? Perhaps because, unlike the Articles, the
Constitution included no single clause establishing different voting requirements for different categories
of legislation. Perhaps because the relevant provision of the treaty-like Articles dealt with majority
voting on a state-by-state basis, which had no relevance at all to the new Constitution. Perhaps because
the Articles established a majority-of-all-the-states rule, which the Constitution effectively abandoned in
its separate Quorum Clause. See supra note 45. Whatever the precise reason, the controlling point is that
nothing in the historical record indicates that a failure to mention majority voting expressly in the
Constitution reflected a plan to shift away from majority rule. To the contrary, that record shows beyond
peradventure that the Framers viewed the Articles as having made too little provision for legislative
majoritarianism, rather than too much. See infra notes 233–62 and accompanying text.
153
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 96, at 55 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690).
154
Josh Chafetz, Leaving the House: The Constitutional Status of Resignation from the House of
Representatives, 58 DUKE L.J. 177, 209–10 (2008).
155
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 23, 171
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
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will of the society enounced by the majority of a single vote, as sacred as if
unanimous, is the first of all lessons in importance . . . .156

William Blackstone, the period’s most influential Anglo-American legal
thinker, put the point even more bluntly, declaring that, under the British
system, “[i]n each house the act of the majority binds the whole.”157 This
same understanding surfaced again in the Commentaries of Joseph Story,
who observed that the Constitution’s two-thirds-vote rule for impeachment
convictions “deserted” the general principle of “all legislative bodies,”
under which a “mere majority make the decision.”158 In sum, during the

156

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron F.H. Alexander Von Humboldt (June 13, 1817), in 10
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 88, 89 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons
1899). Jefferson’s writings abound with such proclamations. See generally Thomas Jefferson, Notes on
the State of Virginia, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 155, at 171 (citing majority rule
as “the natural law of every assembly of men, whose numbers are not fixed by any other law”); Thomas
Jefferson, Observations on the Article États-Unis Prepared for the Encyclopedie, in 4 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 158, 173 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1894)
(“[America is] a country where the will of the majority is the law . . . .”); Thomas Jefferson, The Anas,
in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 154, 215 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s
Sons 1892) (“[T]he will of the majority honestly expressed should give law.”); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 86, 90 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1895) (“[T]he fundamental law of every society[]
[is] the lex majoris partis, to which we are bound to submit.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the
Democratic Citizens of the County of Adams, Pennsylvania (Mar. 20, 1808), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 262, 262 (H.A. Washington ed., Washington, D.C., Taylor & Maury 1853) (“[A]
nation ceases to be republican only when the will of the majority ceases to be the law.”); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to the Deputies of the Cherokee Upper Towns (Jan. 9, 1809), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 228, 229 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, Derby & Jackson 1859) (“Our way
is . . . to consider that as law for which the majority votes.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George
Washington (Sept. 9, 1792), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 101, 103 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1895) (“[T]he measures of the fair majority . . . ought always to be
respected.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 4 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 473, 479 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1894) (“[I]t is
my principle that the will of the majority should always prevail.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John
Breckenridge (Jan. 29, 1800), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 416, 417 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1896) (stating that the lex majoris partis is a “fundamental law of
nature, by which alone self government can be exercised by a society”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to William Carmichael (June 3, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 22, 25 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1895) (endorsing “the principle that the majority
must give the law”); Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp (“[A]bsolute acquiescence in the decisions of the
majority[] [is] the vital principle of republics . . . .”); The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, PRINCETON
UNIV., http://www.princeton.edu/~tjpapers/index.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
157
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *181.
158
2 STORY, supra note 45, § 776, at 247 (adding that the two-thirds-vote impeachment-conviction
rule might have been challenged on this ground); see id. § 887, at 354 (noting that the veto override
power is based in part on the principle that “all laws . . . passed might, at any time, be repealed at the
mere will of the majority”); id. § 1091, at 539 (opining that the rejection of supermajority voting rules
for navigation acts stemmed in part from “the general impropriety of allowing the minority in a
government to control, and in effect to govern all the legislative powers of the majority”).
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period of the framing, there existed a firm understanding that, when
parliamentary bodies legislate, they do so by majority vote.
In the face of these pronouncements, Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport direct attention to a general treatment of parliamentary process
written by Luther Stearns Cushing in 1856. In one passage in his treatise,
Cushing wrote:
[T]he law of the majority is universally admitted in all legislative assemblies;
unless, in reference to particular cases, persons or circumstances, a different
rule is prescribed, by some paramount authority, or is agreed upon beforehand
and established by the assembly itself, by which a smaller number is permitted,
or a larger number is required, to do some particular act. But even in these
cases, it is the will of the majority that governs; because it is by a major vote,
in the first instance, that the rule itself is established . . . .159

Based on this text, McGinnis and Rappaport claim that “it was
understood in the nineteenth century that legislatures could enact
supermajority rules” applicable to the enactment of bills.160 These sentences,
however, do not speak directly to the passage of bills (particularly bills in
the Federal Congress), as opposed to, for example, the management of
internal proceedings pursuant to mechanisms such as agenda-setting and
debate-cloture rules.161 What is more, in a nearby passage that all but tracks
the “passed” language of Article I, Cushing declared without qualification
that “whatever is regularly agreed upon by a majority of the members of a
159

CUSHING, supra note 59, para. 414, at 168 (footnote omitted).
McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 493.
161
See, e.g., Open Letter, supra note 6, at 1541 (recognizing the potential propriety under the Rules
of Proceedings Clause of a supermajority voting rule to suspend the rules in exceptional circumstances
because such a rule does not involve substantive decisionmaking but instead the sequencing of
business). The point is that the Cushing statement on its face is uncontroversial, because some tasks—
such as committee reviews and interchamber negotiations—are unquestionably assignable to groups
other than legislative majorities. However, as this article makes clear—and as the unanimous Court
recognized in Ballin—the enactment of bills other than by majority vote falls into a different category. It
is noteworthy in this regard that the quotation from the Cushing treatise endorses action, in certain
contexts, not only by a “larger number” than a majority but also and equally action by a “smaller
number.” As explained elsewhere, however, the possibility of passing laws by submajority vote has been
rejected both in Ballin and by the modern Court. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. In
addition, Cushing endorses at most nonmajority voting rules only “in reference to particular cases,
persons or circumstances.” See text accompanying supra note 159 (quoting this language) (emphasis
added). The Any-Voting-Number Theory itself, however, goes much further and thus violates even the
most generous reading of Cushing because it countenances supermajority voting rules that apply to all
bills in an across-the-board fashion. Also of particular significance is the strong indication given by
Cushing elsewhere in his treatise that any power to formulate bill-related supermajority voting rules
would have no application to the Federal Congress. This inference stems from his unqualified
observation that “[i]n the constitution of the United States . . . it is provided, that the [Vice President, in
his capacity as presiding officer of the Senate] shall give the casting vote, when the body over which he
presides is equally divided.” CUSHING, supra note 59, para. 298, at 115 (emphasis added). See generally
supra Part I.B (discussing the inherent incompatibility of supermajority voting rules with the grant to the
Vice President of the casting vote power).
160
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legislative assembly is a thing ‘done and past’ by that body.”162 This
statement, it bears emphasis, is particularly suggestive of the meaning of the
Presentment Clause because sources from the time demonstrate
conclusively that the terms “passed” and “past” were interchangeable under
then-prevailing usage.163 Considered as a whole, then, the passages from
Cushing may well cut more against, than for, the Any-Voting-Number
Theory. But even if that reading of the textual tea leaves is inadmissible,
Luther Cushing, though a fine parliamentarian, was not Thomas Jefferson
or a member of his generation.164 And it is the intensely majority-rulecentered ideas of Jefferson—together with those of Locke, Blackstone,
Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, Franklin, and their contemporaries—that
dominated the framing of the American Constitution.165
The mandatory norm of legislative majoritarianism that these Framers
embraced took hold in large measure because it made good sense. We will
soon see (in sections B, C and D) why it made sense in light of thendominant philosophical outlooks and political realities. The point here (that
is, in the remainder of section A) is something else—namely, that the norm
dovetailed with background legal doctrines of which the Framers were well
aware. The most salient of those doctrines were the settled prohibition on
entrenching legislative programs and the canon of interpretation that
eschews absurd results.
2. The Anti-Entrenchment Rule.—Empowering the chambers of
Congress to install supermajority voting rules for enacting laws would raise
pressing tensions with the long-recognized ban on legislative entrenchment.
At the core of Britain’s unwritten Constitution, solidly in place at the time
of the framing, stood one idea: “Acts of parliament derogatory from the
power of subsequent parliaments bind not.”166 This rule against legislative
entrenchment was carried over from the mother country into American
162

CUSHING, supra note 59, para. 412, at 167 (emphasis added).
2 WEBSTER, supra note 35, at 31. Of no less importance, this treatment of the word “past” in
British law was commonplace in the preconstitutional period. See, e.g., LAWS AND ACTS PAST IN THE
FOURTH AND LAST SESSION OF THE SECOND PARLIAMENT OF OUR MOST HIGH AND DREAD SOVERAIGN
CHARLES THE SECOND 1673–74 (Edinburgh, His Majestie’s Printers 1674) (emphasis added). Nor
should this parallelism be surprising because “[p]ast originated simply as a variant spelling of passed,
the past participle of pass.” JOHN AYTO, WORD ORIGINS: THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF ENGLISH WORDS
FROM A TO Z 369 (2d ed. 2005).
164
Not surprisingly, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport themselves emphasize the parliamentary
writings of Thomas Jefferson, albeit in other contexts. See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at
332 n.26 (citing these materials regarding the “right and duty” of members to vote); id. at 333 n.28
(same).
165
See King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 178 n.212 (dismissing Cushing’s statement
as “to say the least, less than compelling”).
166
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90; see also Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1029
(relying on Bacon, Coke, Petyt, Blackstone, and Dicey in asserting that “canonical sources on English
law certainly support a constitutional principle against legislative entrenchment”).
163
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law,167 and the Supreme Court has endorsed it time and again.168 For
instance, the Court has recognized that “no one legislature can, by its own
act, disarm their successors of any . . . powers.”169 The Court has also
declared: “The latter [legislatures] have the same power of repeal and
modification which the former had of enactment, neither more nor less. All
occupy, in this respect, a footing of perfect equality.”170
Supermajority voting rules raise difficulties under this principle
because any such rule makes it harder for Congress to act, in whatever field
the rule touches, than was the case before the rule came to be.171 Consider,
for example, a new rule that provides that the Senate cannot pass civil rights
laws except by a two-thirds vote. This rule would lock in federal civil rights
law as it stood on the date of the rule’s adoption because that law could no
longer be modified except by way of supermajority, rather than simple
majority, action. The resulting discordance between supermajority voting
rules and the anti-entrenchment principle could not be more apparent.172
Defenders of the Any-Voting-Rule Theory object to this analysis by
recurring to a now-familiar centerpiece of their thinking. They say that
supermajority voting rules do not unduly entrench preexisting law because
the houses of Congress retain the “ultimate power” to repeal those rules
(including, for example, our hypothetical two-thirds-vote civil rights rule)
by majority vote.173 As we already have seen, however, this argument runs
167

See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 45 (manuscript at 449, 476 n.56) (noting that there is “[c]lear
evidence that the founding generation accepted” the antientrenchment principle); Chafetz, supra note 18,
at 1033 (concluding that “American history, like the British, . . . evinces a strongly anti-entrenchment
view”); John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster Reform,
27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 204 (2003); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative
Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 404–05; Fisk &
Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 247.
168
See, e.g., Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932) (“[T]he will of a particular
Congress . . . does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding years.”); Conn. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 621 (1898) (noting the “general policy” that “each subsequent legislature
has equal power to legislate”).
169
Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 431 (1853).
170
Newton v. Comm’rs, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879).
171
See Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1034.
172
To be sure, some commentators have challenged the validity of the antientrenchment doctrine
altogether. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE
L.J. 1665, 1666 (2002). But the Court has embraced the principle over many years while never signaling
reservations about its deep historical roots or its centrality to American law. See supra notes 168–70 and
accompanying text.
173
See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. The McGinnis-Rappaport position on the power
of majorities to alter rules by majority vote is not universally shared. In particular, Virginia Seitz and
Joseph Guerra argue that there is no constitutional bar on requiring supermajority votes to change rules
even if there is such a bar with respect to changing laws. See Virginia A. Seitz & Joseph R. Guerra, A
Constitutional Defense of “Entrenched” Senate Rules Governing Debate, 20 J.L. & POL. 1, 3 (2004).
From this vantage point, the Any-Voting-Number Theory must fail because no plausible view of the
antientrenchment principle can tolerate supermajority requirements both for rules and for laws.
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up against hard reality because supermajority rules, once promulgated, do
have continuing effects regardless of the doctrines that govern their
repealability.174 Those effects, moreover, are magnified in the Senate
because it has always been viewed as a “continuing body,” with the
consequence that its rules remain operative, often for decades, until
affirmatively singled out for alteration.175 For these reasons, our
hypothesized civil-rights-law supermajority voting rule makes it harder to
adopt civil rights laws than was the case before—a result that defeats the
“perfect equality” of legislatures over time that the prohibition on
entrenchment purports to vindicate.176
The Framers knew the anti-entrenchment doctrine well.177 It was a
central—perhaps the central—doctrine of then-extant British constitutional
law.178 There is no reason to believe that the Framers lost track of that
doctrine as they shaped the charter of 1787. As a result, good reason exists
to believe they meant to endorse the mode of passing laws most attuned to
that doctrine’s purposes and commands. That mode reflects an
uncomplicated idea—namely, that all legislatures at all times will enact all
laws by simple majority vote.
3. Absurd Results.—There is another reason rooted in background
law for concluding that the Framers embraced an unabridgeable mandate of
legislative majoritarianism. The reason is that a rejection of that mandate is
in tension with the canon of construction that abjures “absurd results.”179
Professor Rubenfeld’s argument against the Any-Voting-Number Theory
centered on this point.180 He suggested, for example, that the theory would
authorize a “Big Three Rule,” under which votes cast by House members
from California, New York, and Texas would not count in determining the
fate of a bill.181 In reaching this conclusion, Professor Rubenfeld reasoned
that the Big Three Rule should be no more constitutionally problematic than
Rule XXI(5)(c), if in fact the Rules of Proceedings Clause permits the
House to fiddle with voting rules in wide-open fashion. Professors
174

See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
See Aaron–Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 1401, 1406 (2010).
176
Newton v. Commr’s, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879).
177
See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 345.
178
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
179
E.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982); see also 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91 (agreeing that the law eschews “absurd consequences, manifestly
contradictory to common reason”).
180
See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 79–80. Professor Chafetz has also advanced an absurd-results
argument, claiming that if the word “passed” permits either house of Congress to impose supermajority
voting requirements, then the word “elected” in the Seventeenth Amendment should logically permit
that house to install a supermajority election requirement to displace incumbent House Members or
Senators. Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1013.
181
See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 79–80.
175
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McGinnis and Rappaport responded by claiming that neither the Big Three
Rule nor any of several other nightmarish voting methods Professor
Rubenfeld had concocted would pass constitutional muster under the theory
they espoused. As for the Big Three Rule, it could not stand because it
would violate the House Composition Clause, which states that “[t]he
House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States,”182 thus implying that each
House member must receive one equally weighted vote.183 According to
Professor Rubenfeld, however, the making of this argument hoisted
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport on their own petard. The problem, he
asserted, was that deriving an unabridgeable one-equally-weighted-vote rule
from the sparse language of the House Composition Clause (which on its
face speaks only to membership in the House, rather than to voting rules)
entailed an even more adventurous non-text-based interpolation than
deriving a fixed principle of majority voting from the word “passed” in
Article I, Section 7.184
One need not work through each of Professor Rubenfeld’s feared
applications of the McGinnis-Rappaport approach—and each of his
adversaries’ intricate rejoinders—to come away with nervousness about the
approach itself. The very existence of such vexing quandaries throws the
Any-Voting-Number Theory into a negative light, at least if one values the
avoidance of needless complexity in basic rules of law. And the problem is
worse—indeed, much worse—than that. For whatever one concludes about
the Big Three Rule, the constitutional principle advanced by Professors
McGinnis and Rappaport invites the installation of a bizarre assortment of
congressional voting methodologies.
One set of problems concerns the interaction of different clauses in the
Constitution. We have already seen that the Any-Voting-Number Theory
produces one serious anomaly—namely, that Congress can subject itself to
a higher bar to pass a law than to override a presidential veto.185 The Treaty
Clause raises a related problem. Because of the extraordinary characteristics
of treaties, Article II requires the Senate to approve them by a two-thirds
vote. Of particular importance for our purposes, the Treaty Clause on its
face forecloses the imposition of any stricter ratification benchmark by
expressly stating that treaties come into effect “provided two thirds of the
182

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 333 n.28.
184
See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 83. There is more to be said about the reliance Professors
McGinnis and Rappaport place on the House and Senate Composition Clauses. Of particular
importance, as we have seen, they find latent in these Clauses a strong principle that each House
member (and presumably each Senator) must have an equally weighted vote. Recognizing this norm of
equality, however, puts supermajority rules in danger because such rules afford bill opponents and bill
proponents, very different—and thus unequal—levels of decisionmaking power. See infra notes 287–90
and accompanying text.
185
See supra Part I.A.
183
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Senators present concur.”186 The topsy-turvy result is hard to miss. It arises
because the Framers signaled the need for a much-heightened level of
legislative consensus in the distinctly important treaty-ratification context,
as opposed to the routine-legislation context. Under the Any-VotingNumber Theory, however, the Senate is free to push past a two-thirds
voting requirement to enact even the most mundane of bills, while not being
free to push past that threshold to approve the most consequential of
treaties. Indeed, the theory permits promulgation of rules under which
mundane laws must be passed by 75%, 80%, or even greater majorities in
both the House and Senate, while treaties automatically become federal law
upon a 67% vote of the Senate alone. Few will question that an
endorsement of this far-more-caution-for-mundane-laws-than-for-treaties
outcome would be troublingly strange.187
Another set of difficulties is raised by submajority voting rules, which
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport do not hesitate to defend.188 Might it
186

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Another form of intertextual problem is raised by the Constitution’s treatment of senatorial
consent to presidential nominations. See id. The governing clause requires, without more,
“the . . . Consent of the Senate” for the appointment of “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States.” Id. Apparently, under
the Any-Voting-Number Theory, the Senate could specify by rule that its “consent” is given only if it
votes by more than 70% or 80% to approve a presidential appointment. In other words, the Senate could
impose on itself a numerical test for approving appointments that is more exacting than the unalterable
two-thirds approval requirement for treaties, even though the Framers went out of their way to make it
more difficult to approve treaties than to approve presidential appointments.
A kindred problem is posed by the Constitution’s Expulsion Clause, id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, which on its
face installed a much more exacting voting rule for expelling members based on wrongdoing than was
applicable to excluding them under the Qualifications Clause, id. art. I. § 5, cl. 1, due to technical
ineligibility. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969). The Constitution’s terms, however,
do not explicitly preclude either House from raising the requisite vote for exclusion to two-thirds or
three-quarters or even 90%. The self-imposition of any such rule, however, would contravene the
Framers’ plain plan to differentiate between these two distinct vehicles for restricting legislative
membership. Notably, in defending what became the Expulsion Clause, Madison argued that “the right
of expulsion . . . was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum.” 2 FARRAND, supra
note 50, at 254. As a result, “[h]e moved that ‘with the concurrence of 2/3’ might be inserted between
may & expel.” Id. Gouverneur Morris responded that “[t]his power may be safely trusted to a majority.”
Id. The underlying supposition of both men seems clear: This choice between the vote of a “majority of
a quorum” or “the concurrence of 2/3” was binary. There was no suggestion that one chamber might
adopt its own rule, under which it would be harder to exclude members for failing to meet technical
qualification requirements than to expel them for serious wrongdoing.
188
See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 490 n.38. Many of us will sense that the AnyVoting-Number Theory’s support of submajority voting rules faces such serious trouble under core
democratic principles that those rules cannot possibly stand. Of no small importance, the Supreme Court
has indicated its agreement with this conclusion not only in United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5–6
(1891), but also in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983). See text accompanying supra note 133.
And submajority voting rules clash as well with early pronouncements of key authorities. See, e.g., 2
STORY, supra note 45, § 699, at 180–81 (noting, in light of the Constitution’s structuring of the House
and the Senate, that “[n]o law or resolution can be passed without the concurrence, first of a majority of
the people, and then of a majority of the states”). Supermajority-voting-rule defenders might seek to
187
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really be, for example, that a bill can become law based on the affirmative
votes of only one Senator and only one House member followed by
presidential approval? So long as that result is supported by House and
Senate rules, this exotic style of lawmaking would be permissible under the
Any-Voting-Number Theory.189 What if the Senate specified by rule that
any measure adopted by majority vote in the House is deemed passed so
long as fifteen (or ten or five) Senators vote for it? Such a result would in
effect rule-make the Senate out of existence—or at least compromise in the
most extreme way that body’s intended checking function.
These difficulties take on an even sharper focus when one recalls that
the Any-Voting-Number Theory invites creation of any mix of nonmajority
voting rules for any mix of legislative subjects. Different bill-passing
rules—of either the supermajority or submajority genre—might be
established for laws that deal with tax increases, benefit cuts, agriculture,
railroads, banking, and on and on.190 Proliferating definitional ambiguities
would wait in the wings, together with government-delegitimizing protests
about unequal access to the federal lawmaking process.191

sidestep these problems by stipulating that the Constitution does impose an unmodifiable requirement of
at least a majority vote to pass a law. This response, however, proves too much because the essential
problem with supermajority rules (particularly on the view of the Framers themselves) is that they
channel controlling voting power to a minority of legislative dissenters. See infra notes 233–61 and
accompanying text. At the least, such a concession would again signal that the majority voting norm is
not a mere default rule subject to freestyle modification under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. See
supra notes 92–101 and accompanying text. But if that is so, why should the majority voting norm
operate as only a half-default rule—permitting self-imposed supermajority voting requirements while
precluding submajority voting rules promulgated under the same supposed grant of authority? To say the
least, these difficulties cut against acceptance of the Any-Voting-Number Theory.
189
See King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 176–77 (noting that some applications of the
Any-Voting-Number Theory would “[o]bviously . . . make a mockery . . . of . . . any notion of
democracy”).
190
See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 489 & n.31 (acknowledging that the Any-VotingNumber Theory could produce a “proliferation” of supermajority voting rules on different subjects as
well as rules that establish “unusual or odd proportions” to pass laws; also claiming, however, that
“[o]ne would expect a chamber to choose round numbers” in part “to avoid . . . ridicule” (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
191
That theory, for example, welcomes congressional establishment of supermajority rule for
enacting tax laws. But is a user fee a tax? Fines, penalties, or interest provisions associated with the
nonpayment of taxes? Always? Which ones? It is telling in this regard that Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport acknowledge the value of certainty in this area by arguing that the approach offered here
should be rejected in part because it involves a “subjective standard” that would “create chaos” as to
“what rules were valid.” McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 484. The approach offered here,
however, is of a distinctly bright-line nature because it targets only rules that, in explicit numerical
terms, require a submajority or a supermajority vote to pass laws. Whether this principle reaches other
supermajority devices, such as the Senate’s filibuster rules, is an entirely separate question. See
Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 88 (distinguishing filibuster rules because they do “not purport to alter the
Constitution’s rules of recognition” (emphasis omitted)). Even if it is thus applicable, however, such a
conclusion would hardly breed “chaos”; it would simply breed a change in Senate filibuster practice. In

1131

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

These problems are all the more acute because bill-related votingnumber requirements are rules of recognition—that is, part of the
foundational body of law that determines whether new rights and duties
have been created at all. The Framers appreciated that rules of recognition
call for the highest levels of clarity and ease of application.192 Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Chadha trumpeted exactly this point. There, as we have
seen, the question was whether Congress could establish a procedure that
permitted one or both chambers to overturn rules promulgated by agencies
without presentment to the President. Highlighting the value of simplicity in
rules of recognition, the Court scuttled this “political invention”193 because
it conflicted with the Framers’ “single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure” for enacting laws.194
The procedure for enacting laws envisioned by the Any-VotingNumber Theory was not “exhaustively considered” by the Framers; indeed,
the Framers never considered it at all.195 Nor is that procedure either
“single” or “finely wrought.” Instead, the Any-Voting-Number Theory
would tolerate a crazy quilt of voting rules in the House and yet another
crazy quilt in the Senate. There is no evidence anywhere that the Framers
favored such an ahistorical and complicated approach to formulating rules
of recognition. The value of legal clarity thus conjoins with the wisdom of
avoiding absurd results to confirm that the Framers’ embraced a system of
acting on all bills by simple majority vote.196
B. Republicanism
The foregoing discussion shows why the Any-Voting-Number Theory
trenches on a settled norm of parliamentary practice, as well as background
legal doctrines that the Framers knew well. The Framers, however, were not
only learned in the law. They were also students of philosophy. Indeed, they

any event, operative legal principles cannot be ignored simply because honoring them involves
disruption of currently prevailing practices. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
192
See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 167 (statement of John Dickinson) (favoring the
authority of Congress to reject state laws in all cases rather than some because “[h]e thought the danger
greater” from a choice “[t]o leave the power doubtful,” thus “opening another spring of discord”). See
generally Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621, 636
(1987) (emphasizing the need for “principles of authoritative determination” to be “clear and settled,” so
that “a legal order can operate . . . smoothly”); McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 500
(recognizing that “formal and determinate rules” are “particularly necessary” in “assessing the
constitutionality of rules that determine whether congressional legislation is law”).
193
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945 (internal quotation marks omitted).
194
Id. at 951; see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438–40 (1998) (reaffirming
importance of a “finely wrought” constitutional lawmaking process in invalidating Congress’s vesting of
a “line item veto” power in the President).
195
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
196
See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 3, at 5 (concluding that Rule XXI(5)(c) is inconsistent with
Chadha).
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were philosophers who lived in an age of unequaled achievement in fertile
reflection on the nature of political institutions.
What values marked the political philosophy of the Framers? Above all
else, they devoted themselves to the cause of republican self-rule. What is
more, their devotion to this idea was acutely personal and intense, because
family members, colleagues, neighbors, and friends had fought and died for
this cause. As a result, a commitment to republicanism lay at the root of
everything the Framers did—so much so that “the general form and aspect
of the government” had to be “strictly republican” because “no other form
would be reconcileable with the genius of the people of America; with the
fundamental principles of the revolution; or with that honorable
determination, which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our
political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government.”197
As Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 39: “If the plan of the Convention
therefore be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates
must abandon it as no longer defensible.”198
What, in the Framers’ view, was the relationship between republican
self-rule and legislative majoritarianism? On this point, we have powerful
evidence. In The Federalist, Madison reflected with care on the place of
supermajority voting rules in the American system. He began his analysis in
his most famous essay, No. 10, by explaining that “[w]hen a majority is
included in a faction, the form of popular government . . . enables it to
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights
of other citizens.”199 (Note here the underlying assumption that majority
factions will be able to oppress minorities precisely because they will wield
power by majority vote.) According to Madison, it followed that: “To
secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a
faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular
government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are
directed . . . .”200 (Note again that the “danger of such a faction” was the
danger of oppression by way of majority vote.)
Madison’s musings did not stop there. He went on to prescribe an
antidote to the maladies posed by majority factions. That antidote did not
involve supermajority voting rules for an obvious reason: such majoritydefeating requirements were in their nature incompatible with “the spirit
and the form of popular government.”201 Instead, the proper cure for
197

THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 9, at 250 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
Id.
199
Id. NO. 10, at 60–61 (James Madison).
200
Id. at 61.
201
Id. This is so because, in the minds of the Framers, popular sovereignty and majority rule were
inextricably interlinked. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 141, at 760 (emphasizing that “republican
principles,” deemed critical by Madison and others, “were rooted in majority rule popular sovereignty”
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 9, at 291 (James Madison)) (internal quotation mark
198
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majoritarian overreaching began with the idea that “the majority, having
such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and
local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of
oppression.”202 Put another way, generous portions of government power
were to be channeled to the expansive republic that was the nation, within
which many interests would clash; stable majorities would be hard to form;
and nefarious plans of factional abuse would be hard to hatch because they
would be hard to hide.203 In addition, formation of the large republic would
lead to creation of populous voting districts that in turn would produce
leaders best situated to withstand the shortsighted pressures of powerful
demagogic movements.204 Finally, structural components of the selfgoverning unit—such as the separation of federal powers, the requirement
of congressional bicameralism, and the retention of states as competing
centers of loyalty and power—would cut down the risk that a “sudden
breese of passion” or “transient impulse” would lead to majority oppression
of helpless minorities.205 As Madison observed in concluding No. 10: “In
the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a
Republican remedy for the diseases most incident to Republican
Government.”206
Proponents of the Any-Voting-Number Theory try to tap into this
rhetoric by arguing that one part of the “structure of the Union” that offered
a “remedy” for majority misdeeds lay in the power of the House and the
Senate to place supermajority voting constraints upon themselves. The flaw
in this argument is that it does not propose a “Republican remedy” for the
diseases of majority faction; instead it proposes what is in its nature a
counter-Republican remedy. What is more, it propounds a structural check
on majority tyranny that the authors of The Federalist, who were all but
obsessive about this topic, never paused to mention—or even hint at—as
being part of the constitutional plan. Most important of all, this argument
fails to appreciate what the Framers did say about restraints on majority
voting, including as a curative for majority abuses.

omitted)); King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 133 (“[P]opular sovereignty [is] a notion that
gains practical currency through the fundamental principle of majority rule.” (footnote omitted)). James
Wilson made much the same point at the Pennsylvania ratification convention. Regarding our
government, he declared, “Who are the majority in this assembly? Are they not the people?” Remarks of
James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 62, at 550, 553. Turning to the constitutional plan, he declared that “the Congress” was “to be a
faithful representative of the people”—that is, both as to the people as whole (in the House) and to the
people as state-defined groups (in the Senate). Speech of James Wilson in the Philadelphia State House
Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 167, 169.
202
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 9, at 61 (James Madison).
203
Id. at 62.
204
Id. at 63.
205
Id. NO. 71, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton).
206
Id. NO. 10, at 65 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
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Madison turned to these matters in The Federalist No. 58. He
recognized there that rules that, “in particular cases, if not in all,” call for
“more than a majority of a quorum for a decision” could have produced
“some advantages.”207 In particular, such supermajority voting rules “might
have” provided “another obstacle . . . to hasty and partial measures.”208 The
problem was that “these considerations are outweighed by the
inconveniencies in the opposite scale.”209 Worries arose in part from the
practical consequences that any supermajority voting rule could have,
particularly because “an interested minority might take advantage of it to
screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or in
particular emergencies to extort unreasonable indulgences.”210 But that was
not the worst of it: “In all cases where justice or the general good might
require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the
fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would be
no longer the majority that would rule; the power would be transferred to
the minority.”211
Close attention to the precise wording of Madison’s statement is well
advised. Speaking directly about how “new laws” were “to be passed,” the
Father of the Constitution did not say that legislative majoritarianism was
merely important; he declared the principle to be “fundamental.” Nor did he
say that legislative majoritarianism was supported by one of several
fundamental principles; instead supermajority voting rules offended “the
fundamental principle of free government.”212 Most important of all,
Madison never stated or suggested that his paean to majority voting was
aimed at justifying only a default rule. In all of this, as usual, Madison
chose his words with care. And his message, rooted in foundational
concerns, does not square with a system under which each chamber of
Congress can dispense willy-nilly with legislative majoritarianism as the
operative method for passing the laws of the land.213
Madison’s reflections did not stand alone. Indeed, the republican line
of thinking that he espoused pervaded the work of the framing period.214
The delegates of the Philadelphia Convention, for example, had little
207

Id. NO. 58, at 396 (James Madison).
Id. at 396–97.
209
Id. at 397.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id. (emphasis added).
213
See, e.g., Lieber & Brown, supra note 86, at 2350 (reading THE FEDERALIST to show that the
Framers “clearly contemplated” majority voting on all bills).
214
See, e.g., Amar, supra note 141, at 765 (noting that “former Philadelphia Convention delegate
Caleb Strong observed that ‘in republicks, the opinion of the majority must prevail’” (quoting RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 143 (1969))); supra note 156 (noting Jefferson’s
endorsement of this view). See generally Amar, supra note 141, at 757 (“[T]his linkage between
Republicanism and majority rule runs throughout . . . Founding era discourse more generally.”).
208
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difficulty agreeing that members of the House should be elected by the
people. The reason why, as James Wilson explained, was that it “will then
come nearer to the will or sense of the majority.”215 Alexander Hamilton
took a view of majority voting rules precisely parallel to that of Madison
when he wrote that it is a “fundamental maxim of republican government,
which requires that a sense of the majority should prevail.”216 Again, close
attentiveness to Hamilton’s word choice is important. The maxim of
majority rule of which Hamilton spoke was not just significant; it was
“fundamental.” And, as with Madison, the majority-vote principle he
endorsed was not put forward as only a weak default rule, but as a strong
principle under which “the sense of the majority should prevail.”217
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport suggest that on close inspection
these statements offer little useful insight into the Framers’ views on
legislatively self-imposed nonmajority voting rules. They claim, for
example, that the pronouncements of No. 58 are of limited significance
because at the Convention “Madison argued for . . . a reversal [of the
majority-vote norm] so many times that it is hard to credit that he believed
it was fundamental.”218 On this point, McGinnis and Rappaport go several
bridges too far. To the extent that Madison endorsed supermajority rules at
the Convention, he did so—like other delegates—only for “special cases”
that “merited special consideration.”219 His actions were thus entirely
consistent with his later public assertions that legislative majoritarianism
reflects a “fundamental principle.”220 In addition, while Madison advocated
215
216
217

92.

218

1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 142 (statement of James Wilson).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 9, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id. (emphasis added). For a similar view, see King, Use of Supermajority, supra note 6, at 390–

John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 703, 720–21 (2002).
219
Neals-Erik William Delker, The House Three-Fifths Tax Rule: Majority Rule, the Framers’
Intent, and the Judiciary’s Role, 100 DICK. L. REV. 341, 349–50 (1996). See generally infra note 220
and accompanying text (detailing Madison’s proposals).
220
THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 9, at 397 (James Madison). Careful consideration of
Madison’s actions at the Constitutional Convention confirms this point. At one point, for example,
Madison proposed a supermajority requirement for rejecting judicial appointments. 2 FARRAND, supra
note 50, at 80 (statement of James Madison). On another occasion he proposed that Congress should be
able to veto state laws by way of supermajority action. As with the Constitution’s treatment of expulsion
and treaty ratification, however, these proposals did not involve ordinary lawmaking processes, and the
latter proposal came only as a fallback after Madison’s initial proposal of a majority-vote congressional
override of state laws ran into tough sledding. See 1 id. at 21 (setting forth paragraph 6 of the Virginia
Plan). It is true that Madison, at one point, proposed a two-thirds voting rule for the taxation of exports.
He did so, however, only as a “lesser evil than a total prohibition” on taxing exports, 2 id. at 363—an
idea that was gaining momentum at the time (and, indeed, was ultimately successful) in the face of
Madison’s vigorous pro-federal-power objections. This effort to secure half-a-loaf acceptance of the
federal power to tax exports, subject to a supermajority constraint, shows nothing more than that, in this
discrete context, Madison had to choose between: (1) his general commitment to legislative
majoritarianism and (2) his all-out opposition to limiting the federal taxing power. That he chose as he
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some supermajority rules, all of those rules were to be embedded in the
Constitution itself221—consistent with the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation in
Ballin that majority voting must control absent contrary instructions in the
“organic law.”222 In any event, Madison set forth his views on the
republican-centered fundamentality of majority voting both prominently
and emphatically in The Federalist, which Supreme Court Justices and
others have long looked to as a distinctly powerful indicator of the
Constitution’s original meaning.223
Advocates of the Any-Voting-Number Theory also offer a line of
historical argument framed at the highest level of generality. They say this:
Madison, Hamilton, and others did not specifically exclude the possibility
of abandoning majority voting under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. At
the same time, they endorsed all sorts of government structures designed to
impede action by factious majorities, including presentment, bicameralism,
and judicial review. As a result (the argument continues), we should be
neither surprised nor troubled to discover within our system the additional
did hardly reveals Madison to be a rabid antimajoritarian. The proper takeaway instead is that all the
delegates—including Madison—viewed these supermajority voting proposals as exceptional, rather than
routine, in nature.
In any event, Madison’s entire constitutional philosophy was built on the principle of majority
decisionmaking. Thus, in THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, he declared it to be “the republican principle” that
the view of “less than a majority” can be defeated by “the majority . . . by regular vote.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 9, at 60 (emphasis added). For further examples, see 1 FARRAND, supra
note 50, at 318 (statement of James Madison) (“According to the Republican theory . . . , Right &
power . . . [are] both vested in the majority . . . .”); id. at 315 (statement of James Madison) (suggesting
during the Philadelphia Convention that under “the social compact of individuals . . . , a Majority would
have a right to bind the rest”); CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 102, at 11 (noting
that Madison consistently opposed state-based representation in the Senate because “it violated the vital
republican principle of majority rule”); Amar, supra note 141, at 771 n.89 (noting that Madison in
February 1787 declared that “the principles of Republican [Governments] . . . rest on the sense of the
majority” (quoting WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 40
(1972)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
221
See supra note 220.
222
See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
223
See generally Dan T. Coenen, A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument of The Federalist and
Its Impact on Constitutional Interpretation, 56 DUKE L.J. 469, 471–73 (2006) (detailing extensive
reliance on THE FEDERALIST, including by the Supreme Court). Notably, Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport take aim at THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 in part by claiming that “in other parts of The Federalist,
Madison was not at all enthusiastic about simple majority rule.” McGinnis & Rappaport, Our
Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 218, at 721. This statement, however, seeks to pare an apple
when the matter at hand involves peeling an orange. Of course, Madison was not “enthusiastic about
simple majority rules,” particularly in systems modeled after the Greek city-states. See THE FEDERALIST
NO. 10, supra note 9, at 61 (James Madison) (declaring that such polities “have ever been spectacles of
turbulence and contention” and “as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths”). His
statements in NO. 58, however, have nothing to do with that subject. Rather, these statements focus on
the voting rules of legislative bodies that operate within a republican system—that is, a system that
should, can, and does constrain “simple majority rule” through use of checking-and-balancing
structures. These were the tools with which Madison sought to combat the excesses of majorities—not
by fostering the abandonment of majority voting, which he viewed as the cornerstone of republicanism.
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protective mechanism of permitting the legislative branches to impose on
themselves supermajority voting restrictions.224
This argument, however, fails to take account of the Framers’ intensely
republican frame of mind. If the Framers’ only goal had been to check risks
posed by oppressive majorities, supermajority voting rules would be fine.
But checking oppressive majorities was not the Framers’ only goal. Of far
greater salience was the plan to construct a government consistent with the
republican form, including the “republican principle, which enables the
majority to defeat [the minority’s] sinister views by regular vote.”225 Simply
put, it offends republican principles to govern under voting rules by which
power is “transferred to the minority.”226 Indeed, that is precisely why the
Framers had to erect checking mechanisms other than supermajority voting
rules as tools for controlling majoritarian excess.227
The critical point is that all these other mechanisms were themselves
consistent with the republican form. American-style bicameralism and
presentment (unlike British-style bicameralism and presentment) were
republican in nature because they channeled authority to decisionmakers
who were accountable either directly or indirectly to the people themselves.
The creation of large voting districts was republican in nature because,
within those districts, it was the people themselves who voted. Even judicial
review was republican in nature because, as Hamilton famously explained
in The Federalist No. 78, the foundational choices made by “We the
People” required effective protection over time.228 All of these innovations
thus worked within the republican form to check the risks of majority
tyranny. They did not depart from the republican form by inviting

224

Professors McGinnis and Rappaport, for example, defend the Any-Voting-Number Theory in
part on the ground that “[b]icameralism and the separation of powers make it difficult for mere
majorities to pass legislation.” McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 508. Professors Fisk and
Chemerinsky try to launch the same boat, arguing that “[a]lmost all of the institutions created by the
Framers of the Constitution reflect a distrust of majorities.” Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 244;
see also Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 18, at 264 (statement of Professor Gerhardt). As explained here,
that is precisely the point: The very norm—and thus the risk—of majoritarian legislating provided the
cause for the Framers to check the lawmaking process through the construction of other “institutions”
also founded on republican principles. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 11, at 525 (“[P]ointing out that the
Constitution contains anti-majoritarian elements does not prove that it contains no majoritarian
ones. . . . [T]he Framers . . . may well have wanted simple majority voting rules even though they
adopted other undemocratic structures.”). There is another point, too: If we need to pull out all the stops
to interpret the Constitution to attend to our “distrust of majorities,” Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11,
at 244, why should we trust majorities to establish supermajority (and submajority!) voting rules?
225
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 9 at 60 (James Madison).
226
Id. NO. 58, at 397 (James Madison).
227
See Norman R. Williams II, Rising Above Factionalism: A Madisonian Theory of Judicial
Review, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963, 971–74 (1994).
228
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 9, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton).
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legislative self-imposition of nonmajoritarian—and thus nonrepublican—
voting rules for enacting ordinary laws.229
Proponents of the Any-Voting-Number Theory are sure to claim that
this analysis undervalues Congress’s “ultimate” ability to repeal
supermajority voting rules by majority vote.230 They may also posit that
philosophical musings, even from the framing period, are too abstract to be
of much help in resolving the specific question considered here. In the face
of these possibilities, it is worth circling back to Madison. In The Federalist
No. 54, the great Framer moved from theory to law. Summarizing how
congressional lawmaking would work, he wrote in simple terms: “Under
the proposed Constitution, the federal acts . . . will depend merely on the
majority of votes in the Federal Legislature . . . .”231 This pronouncement
throws a penetrating beam across our subject. A constitutional system under
which the fate of “federal acts . . . will depend merely on the majority of
votes in the Federal Legislature” is simply irreconcilable with a vacillating
default-rule approach under which Congress may dictate that proposed bills
will not become law even when they do secure “the majority of votes.”232
C. Experience-Based Repudiation of Supermajority Voting Rules
The Framers’ rejection of supermajority voting rules did not spring
solely from parliamentary postulates or deep philosophical commitments to
the cause of republicanism. It also reflected focused goals born of practical
concerns. Federal and state authorities launched the Convention of 1787
because, by then, there existed a national consensus that the Articles of
Confederation were in need of extensive repair. There was a consensus, too,
229

To be sure, in few instances, the Framers imposed supermajority voting rules, but that fact does
not compromise their strong overarching republican outlook, especially with regard to the ordinary
process of enacting legislation. Supermajority voting rules for treaty ratification and constitutional
amendment, for example, dealt with exceptional matter on their face. And supermajority voting for
impeachment convictions involved a quasi-judicial action not far removed from the actions of petit
juries, which historically had acted by way of supermajority (indeed, unanimous) consensus, rather than
simple majority vote.
230
See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 490 (claiming that Madison was addressing only
the question of “a constitutional supermajority requirement” and not “a legislative supermajority
requirement”). Along these lines, in a particularly important passage, Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport insist that “While constitutional supermajority requirements conflict with majority rule,
legislative supermajority requirements do not. A legislative supermajority rule simply involves a
majority imposing a supermajority requirement upon itself until the majority decides to eliminate it.” Id.
at 491. This assertion is question-begging. One might say in the same vein, that the grant to Congress of
legislative power necessarily carries with it a legislative power to give the legislative power away—
particularly since Congress could always reclaim its legislative power by exercising its “ultimate”
legislative power to do so. Under the most basic of constitutional principles, however, such a defaultrule view of the legislative power is untenable. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438–39
(1998).
231
THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, supra note 9, at 371 (James Madison).
232
Id.

1139

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

on the most basic problems. Above all else, the Articles had produced a
federal government that was “frail,”233 “destitute of energy,”234 and marked
by such an “intrinsic feebleness”235 that it had become wholly “inadequate
to the purpose it was intended to answer.”236
Although several problems contributed to the “inefficacy”237 of the
Confederation Congress, one source of difficulty was well understood by
all. Even as the Articles vested Congress with a number of major powers—
including the powers to requisition funds, to raise armies, to borrow money,
to make treaties, to issue coinage, and to govern western lands238—they
simultaneously provided that that body could act on most important matters
only by way of supermajority vote.239 The results were not surprising. The
Confederation Congress confronted difficulty in passing any laws at all.240
And when it had no choice but to act—for example, in demanding needed
monies from the states—it was routinely subjected to holdout moves by
groups of state representatives driven by parochial concerns. The result of
this system was not only stasis but “imbecility”241 and “a deep and solemn
conviction in the public mind, that greater energy of government is
essential.”242
Many of the delegates who attended the Philadelphia Convention had
served in the Confederation Congress. They had experienced firsthand the
debilitating consequences of supermajority voting rules,243 and this
233

Id. NO. 15, at 98 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id. at 93.
235
Id. NO. 22, at 145 (Alexander Hamilton).
236
Id. NO. 2, at 10 (John Jay). See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 359 (1969) (“By the middle eighties Congress had virtually ceased trying to
govern.”).
237
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 9, at 3 (Alexander Hamilton).
238
See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, paras. 4–5.
239
See id., art. IX, para. 6 (requiring a vote of nine states on these matters); see also McGinnis &
Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 218, at 724 (“Because the states feared that
the national government would displace their authority, they insisted that the Articles of Confederation
require that Congress secure a supermajority before it could take most important actions.”).
240
For one account of the adverse effects of supermajority voting rules, see JILLSON & WILSON,
supra note 140, at 138–45, 191–92 (1994).
241
THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 9, at 92 (Alexander Hamilton).
242
Id. NO. 26, at 165 (Alexander Hamilton). As early as 1783, Hamilton had written that
supermajority rules under the Articles had been “destructive of vigor, consistency, or expedition in the
administration of affairs; tending to subject the sense of the majority to that of the minority, by putting it
in the power of a small combination to retard, and even to frustrate, the most necessary measures.”
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Resolutions for a General Convention, in 2 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 269, 273 (John C. Hamilton ed., New York, John F. Trow 1850).
243
See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 144, at 51 (“The delegates to the Constitutional Convention
knew full well from their experiences in the Continental Congresses that requiring supermajorities was a
recipe for stalemate and indecision.”); Roberts, supra note 11, at 528 (“The leaders of the Convention,
who had been members of the Confederation Congress, were . . . frustrated by the supermajority voting
rule that governed its operation.”); see also King, Use of Supermajority, supra note 6, at 388
234
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experience had predictable results. The idea of carrying over the Articles’
system of supermajority voting to the new federal Congress never drew
even a fleeting interest. On only one occasion—when Hugh Williamson
took the floor on June 6, 1787—was it hinted that a generalized two-thirds
voting rule perhaps should be installed.244 The response to this overture was
deafening silence.245 No delegate even seconded the motion, and neither
Williamson nor any of his colleagues again propounded any remotely
comparable idea. In the face of this history, the Any-Voting-Number
Theory would permit either chamber to impose supermajority voting rules
to pass any and all forms of legislation. There is no evidence that the
Framers ever imagined such a thing.246 Indeed, the delegates offered only a
limited number of serious bill-passing supermajority-vote proposals, and
the unbroken consistency with which they were repudiated stands at odds
with the Any Voting-Number Theory.
It is telling in this regard that no delegate ever argued for anything like
that theory, even though opportunities to do so arose on a recurring basis.
No one said, in effect: “Even if we reject your proposed supermajority
voting rule, either house of Congress can impose that rule if it sees a need
to do so under the conditions it then confronts. That possibility should give
us at least a measure of comfort in not constitutionalizing your proposed
supermajority rule for all time in all circumstances.”247 What the Framers’
statements do reveal is that they rejected supermajority voting requirements
for the most simple of reasons: Their experience convinced them that
having such rules was a terrible idea. Roger Sherman declared that “to
require more than a majority to decide a question was always
embarrassing.”248 James Wilson agreed that “[g]reat inconveniences
had . . . been experienced in Congress from the article of confederation
requiring nine votes in certain cases.”249 In short, the Framers “repeatedly
(highlighting Madison’s experiencing of these frustrations). In THE FEDERALIST, Alexander Hamilton
drew on the history of supermajority rules both around the world and under the Articles of
Confederation to reinforce the notion that they did not work in practice. As he explained:
[T]he history of every political establishment in which this principle has prevailed is a history of
impotence, perplexity and disorder. Proofs of this position might be adduced from the examples of
the Roman tribuneship, the Polish diet and the states general of the Netherlands; did not an
example at home render foreign precedents unnecessary.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 9, at 507–08 (Alexander Hamilton).
244
See 1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 140 (statement of Hugh Williamson).
245
Id.
246
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
247
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 814–15 (1995) (“The failure of intelligent
and experienced advocates to utilize this argument must reflect a general agreement that its premise was
unsound . . . .”).
248
2 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 450 (statement of Roger Sherman).
249
Id. at 451 (remarks of James Wilson). The same themes were sounded by delegates to the
ratification conventions. See, e.g., Remarks of Alexander Hamilton to the New York Convention (July 2,
1788), in 22 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 2058, 2074 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008)
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cited the supermajority requirements of the Articles as a source of
frustration and ineffectiveness.”250 This history is of great importance, for it
is all but unthinkable that those who wrote and ratified our Constitution
meant to provide each legislative chamber with the power to adopt the very
sort of rules they denounced as deeply, if not catastrophically, improvident.
The Federalist drives home this conclusion. In No. 22, Hamilton took
aim at supermajority voting rules. He noted that these rules had been
defended (as Professors McGinnis and Rappaport have more recently
defended them) on the ground they “would contribute to security” by
inhibiting excessive and overbearing legislation.251 Drawing on the lessons
of the Articles of Confederation, Hamilton declared that supermajority
voting “in practice has an effect, the reverse of what is expected from it in
theory.”252 More particularly, with supermajority rules:
[W]e are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be
likely to be done; but we forget how much good may be prevented, and how
much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be
necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which
they may happen to stand at particular periods.253

Hamilton especially feared that:
If a pertinacious minority can controul the opinion of a majority respecting the
best mode of conducting it; the majority in order that something may be done,
must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller
number will over-rule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national
proceedings.254

Such rules would give rise to “tedious delays—continual negotiation and
intrigue—[and] contemptible compromises of the public good.”255

(“[T]he Major will should be left open to make the defence and assert the Rights” of the nation;
supermajority voting rules “must not fetter the Govermt.”); Remarks of Governor Edmund Randolph to
the Virginia Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 970, 987 (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990) (criticizing the Articles’ supermajority voting rules
because they “prevent energy . . . even in cases wherein the existence of the community depends on
vigor and expedition”); Remarks of John Jay to the New York Convention (July 2, 1788), in 22
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 2058, 2071 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) (“It is
unwise to le[a]ve the Volition of the whole to be controuled by a part . . . .” (alteration in original)).
250
Teter, supra note 41, at 570; accord, e.g., Roberts, supra note 11, at 528–29 (noting that
“[t]hroughout the Convention, in private letters, and in the ratification debates, [the Framers] bemoaned
the effect of supermajority voting under the Articles” and that this fact “should be given much greater
weight than it has traditionally been given” in evaluating the legality of supermajority voting rules).
251
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 9, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton).
252
Id.
253
Id. at 141 (emphasis omitted).
254
Id.
255
Id.
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Worse yet was the risk of legislative stalemate:
[I]n such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place:
For upon some occasions, things will not admit of accommodation; and then
the measures of government must be injuriously suspended or fatally defeated.
It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the
necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must always
savour of weakness—sometimes border upon anarchy.256

As a New York representative in the Confederation Congress,
Hamilton had seen the impact of supermajority rules, and his declamations
of them came with unrelenting vigor. Those rules portended not only
“contemptible compromises” but “anarchy.”257 Their effect was to subject
“the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority” to the
“caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent or corrupt junto.”258
Hamilton set his gaze on how supermajority voting rules worked “in
practice,” “in reality,” and in “real operation.”259 His conclusion was that
these rules were not just ill-advised; they were “poison.”260 These
ruminations led Hamilton to conclude—in terms charged with significance
for the constitutional question now under consideration—that “all
provisions which require more than the majority of any body to its
resolutions have a direct tendency to embarrass the operations of the
government.”261
This history highlights two points of significance. First, the Framers
condemned the use of supermajority voting requirements for making
ordinary laws in the most forceful terms. Second, because they had lived in
close quarters with these rules’ doleful consequences, they sought to fend
off the dangers that such rules posed in a highly purposeful and self-aware
way. These facts clash with the Any-Voting-Number Theory for the simple
reason that constitutional interpretation must take account of the Framers’
known aims.262 Given the Framers’ focused goal of safeguarding the system
from the ill effects of supermajority voting rules, there is no good reason to
opt for a theory that invites their widespread use (that is, the Any-VotingNumber Theory) over one that excises them from the lawmaking process
(that is, the theory of strict and consistent majoritarianism advocated here).
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D. The Politics of the Framing and Supermajority Voting Rules
Looking back on more than 230 years of self-rule under a single
charter of government, citizens of today may be tempted to underestimate
the din of contentiousness that pervaded the Philadelphia Convention. In
fact, that gathering was a fractious and tense affair. It lasted four months.
Time and again, the threat of impasse loomed. At the end, leading delegates
refused to sign the Constitution, and others would have joined the dissenters
had they not already headed home in disgust.263
This level of testiness should not be surprising. Precisely because the
Convention attracted leading statesmen of the day, strongly held views were
commonplace and not easily remolded by the guiding hand of two or three
dominating figures. The delegates, moreover, came from different states
with different economies, geographies, cultures, histories, and problems.264
Out of the resulting swirl of ever-clashing interests came sometimesimmobilizing discord. How was the Gordian Knot of irreconcilable conflict
cut? In Philadelphia in 1787—as in many times and places—the liberating
saber blow came from political compromise. And, as it turns out, each of
the two greatest compromises reached by the Convention undermines the
Any-Voting-Number Theory.
1. The Slave Trade–Navigation Act Compromise.—One compromise
reached at the Convention specifically concerned supermajority voting
rules. More than two months into the proceedings, controversy erupted
when the Committee on Detail floated the idea that so-called navigation
acts should be subject to enactment only by a two-thirds vote.265 This
initiative reflected the fears of southern delegates that the new Congress
would channel the carriage of southern agricultural exports away from
cheaper European ships to more costly American ships that operated out of
the northern states.266 Not surprisingly, northern delegates recoiled at this
proposed restriction. In the end, however, they could avoid its inclusion in
the Constitution only by swallowing the bitter pill of agreeing to afford
constitutional protection to the slave trade for twenty more years.267 The pill
was bitter because many northern delegates passionately opposed that
barbaric practice268 and because the deep southern states had pushed their
position on this matter to the point of a strident ultimatum.269 In the end,
263
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however, intensely frustrated northern delegates acceded to the twentyyear-rule because the issue had precipitated a near-month of deadlock and,
when push came to shove, they assigned overriding importance to ensuring
majority voting on navigation-act bills. As Maryland delegate Luther
Martin later reported to his state legislature, the northern delegations were
willing to allow a “liberty to prosecute the slave-trade, provided the
southern States would, in their turn, gratify them, by laying no restriction on
navigation acts.”270
With this history in view, it is worth asking this question: In the early
years of the Senate, could the six southern states—aided perhaps by roguish
Rhode Island or section-straddling Delaware—have placed a “restriction on
navigations acts” by adopting a rule that permitted their enactment only by
a two-thirds vote?271 Contrary to the result dictated by the Any-VotingNumber Theory, such a move would have departed from one of the
Convention’s most hard-fought and important decisions. Put simply, the
delegates who struggled to craft the slave-trade compromise surely would
not have tolerated installation of the very supermajority rule that their
solemn agreement emphatically repudiated.272
2. The Great Compromise.—Most students learn that the
Constitutional Convention’s critical moment came with the forging of the
Great Compromise. They often do not learn, however, of the nearly
paralyzing bitterness that marked the weeks that led up to establishment of
our curiously constructed two-house Congress. In some respects, the Great
Compromise was no compromise at all. From the outset of the Convention,
there was broad agreement on the need to establish a bicameral legislature,
with at least one chamber selected according to a principle of proportionate
representation. The drafters of the discussion-shaping Virginia Plan,
however, called for something more. In keeping with the principle that
“[t]he majority of people wherever found ought in all questions to govern
the minority,” they urged that the principle of proportionate representation
270

3 id. app. A, at 211 (emphasis omitted).
Notably, such an outcome, if constitutionally possible, might well have taken hold. See id. at 334
(remarks of George Mason to the Virginia Convention) (opining that a majority of states at the
Convention favored requiring a two-thirds majority to pass navigation acts “till a compromise took place
between the northern and southern states”).
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must guide the structuring of the Senate as well as the House.273 Madison
was adamant on this point, arguing that any departure from “the doctrine of
proportional representation” was “evidently unjust.”274
As the Convention wore on, small-state delegates became no less
insistent in arguing against a federal legislature built solely on the principle
of proportionate representation. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, for
example, made the case for giving the states an “equality of voices” in the
Senate so as “to secure the Small States [against] the large” and to make the
Constitution “conformable to the federal principle” of equivalent state
sovereignty then in place under the Articles of Confederation.275 The largestaters responded with no less zeal by renewing their demands for
proportionate representation. James Wilson framed the argument in
pointedly mathematical terms when he urged that equal state representation
in the Senate would permit “less than 1/3 [of the population] to overrule 2/3
whenever a question should happen to divide the States in that manner.”276
As this debate intensified, small-state delegates shocked the
Convention by proposing the so-called New Jersey Plan.277 In effect, this
proposal recommended abandoning most of what the Convention already
had achieved. Instead of moving forward with a bicameral structure, it
advocated a system built around the unicameral legislature already in place
under the Articles, which afforded each state one vote.278 The divisiveness
spawned by this game-changing gambit was nerve-rackingly intense.279
In the war of words that followed, discussions took on a new level of
sophistication that is of importance to the question under consideration
here. In advocating state equality in the Senate, leaders of the small-state
bloc emphasized that large states would never be exposed to small-state
predation because the population-based House would provide them with
protection against that risk. Virginia Plan advocates responded that this
argument missed the critical point. From their perspective, the problem was
not that the small states could oppress the large ones by crushing them with
new pro-small-state laws. Rather, the problem was that the small states
273
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could use the Senate to impede needed reforms by blocking the enactment
of laws put forward by the House. The primary spokesman for the largestate cause was Wilson, who took pains to explain:
It is true that a majority of States in the [second] branch can not carry a law
[against] a majority of the people in the [first]. But this removes half only of
the objection. Bad [governments] are of two sorts. 1. that which does too little.
2. that which does too much: that which fails [through] weakness; and that
which destroys [through] oppression. Under which of these evils do the
[United] States at present groan? [U]nder the weakness and inefficiency of its
[government]. To remedy this weakness we have been sent to this Convention.
If the motion [for equal representation of the states in the Senate] should be
agreed to, we shall leave the [United States] fettered precisely as heretofore;
with the additional mortification of seeing the good purposes of ye fair
representation of the people in the [first] branch, defeated in the [second].280

It is telling that the small-state representatives did not contest most of
Wilson’s reasoning. They did not challenge his premise that stasis had
emerged as the primary problem under the Articles. They also did not
question his belief that legislative inactivity was deeply inimical to the
public good. They did, however, voice disagreement with one essential
element of Wilson’s critique. It was Oliver Ellsworth who offered the
decisive rebuttal when he declared that, under the Articles, “[n]o salutary
measure has been lost for want of a majority of the States.”281 To anyone
familiar with pre-Convention history, the thread of this argument was easy
to follow: Although “salutary measure[s] . . . had been lost” in the
Confederation Congress, this result was not attributable to the states’ equal
representation; instead, the wishes of “a majority of the States” had been
thwarted by structural problems—including (as we have seen)
supermajority voting rules.282 Ellsworth said, in effect: “Yes, Mr. Wilson,
there are serious problems with the way the Confederation Congress
operates, including because of its inability to pass needed laws. Those
problems, however, do not result from equal representation of the states in
that body. So let’s create a Senate that retains equal state representation but
gets rid of the structural defects. If we do that, even with a new
constitutional requirement of bicameralism, legislative stasis will no longer
be a problem.”
By early July the delegates were so immobilized by this debate that
they turned to the tool of last resort: They referred the matter to a
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committee.283 The committee in due course recommended that the Senate
should, indeed, be constituted to provide equal state representation.284 Its
report, however, oozed with unease. As committee member Elbridge Gerry
explained:
The Committee were of different opinions as well as the Deputations from
which the [Committee] were taken, and agreed to the Report merely in order
that some ground of accommodation might be proposed. Those opposed to the
equality of votes have only assented conditionally; and if the other side do not
generally agree will not be under any obligation to support the Report.285

On July 16, after still more debate, the Convention approved the
committee recommendation. The result of that vote, however, disclosed just
how divisive the subject matter of the Great Compromise remained. Five
states voted aye. Four states voted nay. And the delegates of the only other
then-represented state found themselves evenly divided.286
There are four key points to be gleaned from the story of the Great
Compromise, each of which undermines the Any-Voting-Number Theory.
First, the signature element of the bargain was its creation of a Senate in
which the states would have an “equal voice.”287 Supermajority voting rules
threaten this desideratum, however, because they give unequal
decisionmaking rights to no-voting and yes-voting states.288 Indeed, in The
Federalist, Madison made the critical point that true equality within the
legislature results from majority voting. As he explained, under the
Constitution, legislative enactments “will depend merely on the majority of
votes in the Federal Legislature, and consequently each vote whether
proceeding from a larger or a smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy
or powerful, will have an equal weight.”289 If state equality lay at the core of
the Great Compromise, and state equality hinges (as Madison posits) on the
fact that acts “depend . . . on the majority of votes,” then rules that cause
acts not to depend on a majority of votes erode state equality in a key
constitutional sense. The Any-Voting-Number Theory thus contravenes the
Great Compromise—and the structure of the Senate it established—because
283
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that theory countenances creation of exactly these sorts of equalitydefeating rules.290
Second, the Great Compromise was premised not only on state equality
in the Senate, but on majority rule itself. The question with which the
Framers grappled was whether (as captured in the words of Oliver
Ellsworth) a “majority of the states”—even though containing only a
minority of the overall population—could block the enactment of bills,
including bills already passed by the more democratically accountable
House.291 The world of the Any-Voting-Number Theory, however, is one in
which the fate of bills can be subjected to the decision of a minority of the
states through the Senate’s self-imposition of supermajority voting rules.292
This is simply not how the Framers thought about the degree of potentially
obstructive power the Constitution would give to the small states. In short,
the Any-Voting-Number Theory departs from the basic majority-of-thestates reasoning in which the Great Compromise was grounded.
Third, even the argument for the Great Compromise made by the
small-state contingent envisioned the rejection of decisional structures that
would foster legislative inaction in the Senate. We have seen before that
supermajority voting requirements were, standing alone, a key target of
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expungement by the Framers.293 What we see here is that elimination of
those requirements was also an important ingredient of the Great
Compromise. Oliver Ellsworth’s defense of that compromise rested on the
idea that the new Senate would not labor under the impediments that had
confounded enactment of federal laws under the Articles, including
supermajority voting rules.294 This, then, was part of the trade-off the small
states offered as part of the Great Compromise itself. As a result,
recognition of a power to install supermajority voting rules in the Senate—
especially without approval of the far more representative House—would
breach the essential bargain that brought the Constitution into being.295
Finally, whatever else might be said about the Great Compromise, it
was a compromise, and one that came into existence only (1) by the most
razor-thin of margins, (2) in the face of fierce resistance, and (3) amid an
atmosphere of agonizing skepticism in those delegations that represented a
large majority of the people of the nation.296 The arguments that drove
opposition to the Great Compromise were weighty; equal state
representation in the Senate did stand at odds with both the all-men-areequal ideals of the Revolution and the rightness of taking at least some
account of the distinct interests of the large and the growing states. To be
sure, the representatives of those states agreed to sacrifice those values in an
effort to form a more perfect union. But, fighting tooth and nail all the way,
they sacrificed those values only as far as the Great Compromise reached.
They neither did nor were expected by their fellow delegates to go one
millimeter farther.297
So what did they agree to? They agreed to a system under which, as
James Wilson had explained it, representatives of only some 30% of the
population could obstruct the legislative efforts of the remaining 70%.298
And what did they not agree to? They never endorsed, nor would have
endorsed, a system under which those same representatives of only 30% of
the population could transfer controlling, lawmaking authority to
293
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representatives of only 20% or 10% of the population. The small-state
delegates, in the end, were able to create a Senate based on a “majority of
the states” voting system, despite nearly intractable opposition.299 With this
point in view, the only fair inference is that the sort of double-dipping,
deeply republicanism-diminishing, minority-of-the-states approach to
Senate voting that the Any-Voting-Number Theory imagines would never
have had the blessing of those who framed the Convention’s Great
Compromise.300
*

*

*

For all of the reasons marshaled in Part III, the Any-Voting-Number
Theory stands at odds with our constitutional history. The Framers were
legalists. They were philosophers. They were problem solvers. And they
were politicians thrown into a hornets’ nest of controversy that proved
escapable only by way of hard-won compromises. What is determinative—
and, indeed, remarkable—is that, in each of these four separate roles, the
Framers embraced as a constitutional requisite a fixed norm of legislative
majoritarianism with regard to the ordinary enactment of laws. Proponents
of the Any-Voting-Number Theory ask this question: If the Framers were
so committed to legislative majoritarianism, why did they not write into the
Constitution that neither the House nor the Senate possesses power under
the Rules of Proceedings Clause to reject majority voting as the means of
acting on bills? The history recounted here offers the most plausible
answer: The Framers so incontrovertibly embraced an unabridgeable
principle of majority voting that this question did not occur to them as even
meriting serious attention.301
299
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The same conclusion is supported by Bondurant, supra note 45, at 484 (claiming that “[t]hrough
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perfectly obvious and did not merit specific mention”). Indeed, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport
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however, one such rule is the one defended in this article—namely, that laws are to be passed according
to majority vote.
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CONCLUSION
There is an inherent difficulty in making the case for a single
constitutional rule in a sixty-two-page article, especially one that advances
no fewer than three textual arguments, four historical arguments, and a
multi-pronged structural argument that (among other things) asserts the
inapplicability of the key constitutional clause invoked on behalf of the
opposing position. The difficulty is that one’s critics are sure to say: Thou
“doth protest too much.”302
Readers can and will reach their own conclusions as to whether the
elaborateness of the argument offered here reveals it to be comprehensive
and forceful or strained and overreaching. Either way, this treatment may
serve the useful end of laying bare what originalist arguments there are in
support of a binding norm of legislative majoritarianism. At the least, this
paper reflects a long-overdue effort to take up the challenge laid down by
Any-Voting-Number Theory proponents for others to address their
originalist arguments in a full-blown way.303
Even so, the “doth protest too much” suggestion rightly reminds us to
be careful about losing the forest for the trees. The large questions
addressed here are these: What is more important? To give our legislative
chambers, under the once-little-noticed Rules of Proceedings Clause,
sweeping powers to depart from more than 200 years of uninterrupted
practice by adopting all manner of submajority and supermajority voting
rules? Or to honor those foundational principles—rooted in text, structure,
parliamentary practice, republican governance, practical problem solving,
and hard-won compromise—on which the entire legislative edifice was
built? To ask these questions is to answer them, and to show why the AnyVoting-Number Theory departs from the command of our Constitution.
That command is simple and strong: A bill is passed by a house of
Congress if, and only if, it receives a majority vote.
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